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Professional Secrecy and Its Exceptions:
Spaulding v. Zimmerman Revisited
Roger C. Cramtont and Lori P. Knowlestt
INTRODUCTION
Late in the day of August 24, 1956, in Brandon, Minne-
sota, two cars approached each other on country roads. One
car, driven by John Zimmerman, age nineteen, was traveling
west; the second car, driven by Florian Ledermann, age fifteen,
was heading south toward the intersection. There were no stop
signs at the crossing, and sight of approaching traffic was ob-
scured by the mature corn in the surrounding fields.I The cars
collided, resulting in the deaths of two young persons, one from
each car, and serious injury to nine of the ten other persons in-
volved in the accident.2
David Spaulding, then twenty years old, was one of six oc-
cupants of the Zimmerman car. Three were members of the
Zimmerman family: the driver, John Zimmerman; his brother
t Roger C. Cramton is the Robert S. Stevens Professor of Law, CornellLaw School, Ithaca, NY 14853-4901 (e-mail: cramton@law.mail.cornell.edu).
An earlier version of a portion of this article was prepared by Roger C. Cram-
ton in the form of a short essay for a Legal Ethics Conference at Hofstra Uni-
versity Law School, April 6, 1998, and is used here with permission. The
authors have benefitted from helpful comments from a number of academic
colleagues, especially William H. Hodes, Robert P. Lawry, John Leubsdorf and
Ted Schneyer.
tt Lori P. Knowles is an Associate for Law and Bioethics at the Hastings
Center, Route 9D, Garrison, NY 10524 (e-mail: knowlesl@thehastingscenter.org).
1. In a newspaper account of the accident, a deputy sheriff was quoted
as stating that the visibility at the crossing was good. See 2 Killed Friday in
Car Collision, PARK REGION ECHO (Alexandria, Minn.), Aug. 26, 1956, at 1.
Surviving family members, present at the time, report that high corn im-
paired visibility.
2. See id. Our account is assembled from the reported decision, the rec-
ord on appeal in the Supreme Court of Minnesota, Spaulding v. Zimmerman,
116 N.W.2d 704 (Minn. 1962) (Nos. 38526 and 38529) [hereinafter Record on
Appeal], a newspaper report of the accident, see supra note 1, and telephone
conversations with surviving parties, family members, and lawyers.
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James, age twenty-seven; and their father, Edward. Like the
Zimmermans, the three other passengers-David Spaulding,
his brother Alan, and a man by the name of Howard Leraas-
were employees of a road construction business owned and op-
erated by the Zimmermans. It was just before sundown and
the Zimmermans were driving the Spauldings home from work.
David Spaulding suffered severe injuries: brain concussion,
broken clavicles and a crushed chest. Edward Zimmerman suf-
fered a broken neck and James Zimmerman was killed in the
accident.
The Ledermann vehicle was driven by Florian, age fifteen,
who was driving his father's car on a farm permit. The Leder-
mann family was on its way to the county fair at which Flo-
rian's sister Elaine Ledermann, age twelve, was to participate
in the 4-H Dress Review. The other family members in the car,
all of whom were thrown from it, were Florian's father John,
his mother Pauline, and his two younger brothers, Ben and
Phil. Elaine Ledermann was killed. Her father, John Leder-
mann, lost the use of an arm and thereafter was unable to
work the family farm. Florian Ledermann himself emerged
relatively unscathed physically, although the incident seared
his conscience. The tragic consequences for his family have
been shrouded in silence; Ledermann reports that he was sent
back to school the next week as if nothing had happened and
that the family rarely, if ever, spoke of the accident.3
Spaulding's father brought suit on his behalf against the
drivers and parent-owners of the two vehicles. The three
medical experts who treated David Spaulding did not discover
that, in addition to severe head and chest injuries, Spaulding
had also incurred a life-threatening aneurysm of the aorta,
probably caused by the accident. The physician retained by the
defense lawyers discovered and reported this injury and its
life-threatening character to one of the defense lawyers shortly
before the parties were to meet to discuss settlement. 4
At the settlement conference, Spaulding's claim was set-
tled for $6,500. 5 Spaulding's injuries were not discussed in
specific terms; the defense lawyers, knowing that Spaulding
and his lawyers were unaware of the aneurysm of the aorta,
3. Telephone Interview by Lori P. Knowles with Dr. Florian Ledermann
(Sept. 1997).
4. See Record on Appeal, supra note 2, at 118-20.
5. See Spaulding, 116 N.W.2d at 708.
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did not disclose this injury or make representations concerning
the scope of Spaulding's injuries. Because Spaulding was a
minor when the settlement was made, his lawyer was required
to petition the court to approve the settlement. The petition
included only the injuries known to Spaulding and his lawyer,
who had not been told by defendants' lawyers of the aneurysm.
On May 8, 1957, sixteen days before Spaulding's twenty-first
birthday,6 the court approved the settlement and dismissed the
case. For nearly two years Spaulding lived with a life-
threatening condition of which he and his family were igno-
rant.
Spaulding v. Zimmerman is one of the great gems of law
teaching-a case that rivets the attention of students while en-
couraging in-depth discussion of many of the basic questions
concerning the lawyer's role as advocate and counselor.
Spaulding is extensively discussed in books and articles deal-
ing with legal ethics7 and prominently featured in professional
responsibility casebooks and courses. 8 The case also has im-
portant implications for other courses, such as civil procedure,
torts and insurance.
Spaulding teaches important lessons about the law and
ethics of lawyering: First, the unwillingness of lawyers, judges
and the organized profession to talk openly and seriously about
the situations in which threats of harm to third persons justify
a breach of one of the lawyer's most sacred duties, that of con-
fidentiality to client. Second, the reality, again shrouded in
professional and judicial silence, that the adversary role of the
lawyer in litigation arguably permits, and may sometimes re-
quire, a lawyer to behave in an amoral or immoral way. Third,
6. See Record on Appeal, supra note 2, at 15.
7. See, e.g., DAVID LUBAN, LAwYERs AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY
149-54 (1988); Stephen L. Pepper, Counseling at the Limits of the Law: An Ex-
ercise in the Jurisprudence and Ethics of Lawyering, 104 YALE L.J. 1545, 1606
(1995).
8. The case is reprinted in at least five professional responsibility cour-
sebooks. See ROBERT F. COCHRAN, JR. & TERESA S. COLLETT, THE RULES OF
THE LEGAL PROFESSION 65-69 (1996); GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. ET AL., THE
LAW AND ETHICS OF LAWYERING 5-9 (2d ed. 1994); L. RAY PATTERSON &
THOMAS B. METZLOFF, LEGAL ETHICS: THE LAW OF PROFESSIONAL RE-
SPONSIBILITY 430-35 (3d ed. 1989); DEBORAH L. RHODE, PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY: ETHICS BY THE PERVASIVE METHOD 248-52 (1994); DEBORAH
L. RHODE & DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS 249-52 (2d ed. 1995).
1998]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
the centrality to good lawyering of the professional duty to
communicate legal and factual information to clients so that
they may exercise their decisionmaking authority effectively.
Fourth, the importance of moral dialogue between lawyer and
client about the ends as well as the means of representation,
especially when substantial interests of third persons are
threatened with harm. Fifth, the ubiquity of lawyer conflicts of
interest and the threat they pose to client representation and
to the public interest in just outcomes. 9 And finally, the truth
that the duties and obligations of lawyers often find more con-
crete expression in procedural and other law applicable to a
particular situation than they do in the profession's codes of le-
gal ethics. All this and more is implicit in the five page opinion
rendered by the Supreme Court of Minnesota in 1962 under
the caption of Spaulding v. Zimmerman. After analyzing
Spaulding in light of its historical context, this article will ex-
plore these issues and consider their implications, both then
and now.
Why revisit Spaulding at this time? We have three rea-
sons. The first is that nearly every American jurisdiction has
extensively considered the scope of exceptions to the profes-
sional duty of confidentiality since 1983; in that year the
American Bar Association recommended adoption of a set of
rules that substantially narrowed the discretion or obligation
of a lawyer to disclose confidential client information to pre-
vent harm to third persons.10 The confidentiality provisions of
state ethics codes that have emerged from this state-by-state
review give greater respect to third-party interests than do the
comparable provisions of the Model Rules of Professional Con-
duct." More recently, the American Law Institute's proposed
9. In Spaulding, for example, the reality that defense counsel was se-
lected, directed and paid by the liability insurer created a risk that defense
counsel might ignore the insured, deferring to the economic interest of the in-
surer, who controlled repeat business.
10. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1983)
[hereinafter MODEL RULES]. The broader disclosure provisions of the draft
rules developed by the Kutak Commission, rules generally reflecting prior
law, were repeatedly narrowed throughout the drafting process, culminating
in a rejection by the House of Delegates in 1983 of any permissive disclosure
of client fraud. See Ted Schneyer, Professionalism as Bar Politics: The Mak-
ing of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 14 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 677,
700-20 (1989).
11. See Attorneys' Liability Assurance Society, Inc., Ethics Rules on Cli-
ent Confidences, reprinted in THOMAS D. MORGAN & RONALD D. ROTUNDA,
1998 SELECTED STANDARDS ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1998)
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Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers,12 in considering
confidentiality and its exceptions, has provided for broader dis-
closure when threats to life and bodily injury are at stake than
is provided by current law in any U.S. jurisdiction. 13 Under the
proposed Restatement provision, the defense lawyers in
Spaulding would be permitted to reveal the plaintiffs life-
threatening condition even if the individual defendants and the
insurers refused to do so.
We celebrate this recent and lively discussion of the moral
aspects of lawyer conduct. Exploration in court rules, judicial
decisions and professional commentary of the appropriate lim-
its on lawyer secrecy and adversary zeal is likely to lead to
greater agreement and candor on the hard issues that arise
when a lawyer learns during the course of representation that
unless some step is taken, perhaps including the extreme one
of client betrayal, a third person will suffer serious harm.
Our second reason for writing this article is that we hope
to contribute to the debate by offering a concrete proposal and
adding some thoughts on a neglected subject: the effect of a
lawyer's voluntary disclosure of confidential client information
to protect third-party interests on the client's subsequent as-
sertion of the attorney-client privilege. We argue that a law-
yer's permissible disclosure under an exception to the profes-
sional duty of confidentiality does not waive the client's
attorney-client privilege unless the client, after consultation,
has consented to the disclosure. A prosecutor or litigant may
not use the lawyer's testimony against the client in a subse-
quent proceeding because the client retains the attorney-client
privilege in the underlying communication.
Our third reason for revisiting Spaulding is that we have
some new information concerning it. We have attempted to dig
beneath the surface of the brief factual statement in the
Spaulding opinion to discover what really happened. What
was the relationship between the victim, David Spaulding, and
[hereinafter ALAS Memorandum]. This tabulation of exceptions to confiden-
tiality of state ethics rules indicates, for example, that at least 40 jurisdictions
have rejected the ABA position that a lawyer may not disclose confidential
client information to prevent a criminal fraud likely to result in financial in-jury to the property of another.
12. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS (Proposed
Official Draft 1997) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERs].
The confidentiality provisions, sections 111-117B, were given final approval at
the ALI annual meeting on May 11-12, 1998.
13. See id. at 117A.
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the driver of the car in which he was a passenger, John Zim-
merman? What were the circumstances of the accident? Were
the individual defendants consulted by their lawyers concern-
ing the action to be taken with respect to the information that
the lawyers possessed concerning the threat to David Spauld-
ing's life? Were the liability insurers who had retained those
lawyers consulted? What happened when the settlement was
set aside and the case remanded for a new trial? These ques-
tions will be obvious ones to readers who are familiar with the
Spaulding case; their pertinence will become apparent to oth-
ers after we analyze the holding of the case.
I. ANALYSIS OF THE SPAULDING CASE14
David Spaulding's famous lawsuit was only one of several
arising out of the 1956 intersection collision in Brandon, Min-
nesota. Initially, Spaulding was represented by Richard A.
Roberts, a young lawyer at the beginning of his career.' 5 Zim-
merman's insurer selected Norman V. Arveson, an experienced
trial lawyer, as Zimmerman's defense counsel; Chester G. Ro-
sengren acted in the same capacity for the Ledermanns and
their insurer.
After the accident, David Spaulding was treated for his
injuries by his family physician, Dr. James H. Cain. Because
of the severity of David's injuries, he was also examined by two
specialists: Dr. John F. Pohl, an orthopedist, who concluded on
January 3, 1957 from x-rays of David's chest that "heart and
aorta are normal;" and Dr. Paul S. Blake, a neurologist. 16 Re-
ports from these physicians contained no finding of an aneu-
rysm of the aorta.
14. Unless otherwise indicated, the information in the following section is
found in the reported decision, Spaulding v. Zimmerman, 116 N.W.2d 704
(Minn. 1962), or the Record on Appeal, supra note 2.
15. Telephone Interview by Lori P. Knowles with Justice Walter Rogosh-
eske (Retired) (Sept. 1997).
16. Dr. Blake makes an appearance in another well-known case in the
professional responsibility field. He was apparently the neurologist charged
with medical malpractice in the "case within the case" aspect of Togstad v.
Vesely, Otto, Miller, & Keefe, 291 N.W.2d 686 (Minn. 1980) (en banc), a legal
malpractice case against a lawyer who, in a preliminary interview declining to
take the case, gave careless advice about the merits of client's medical mal-
practice claim. The coincidence with Spaulding is even more extraordinary
because Togstad also involves a further harm occurring during the treatment
of an aortic aneurysm.
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In preparation for trial, Spaulding was also examined by
Dr. Hewitt Hannah, a neurologist retained by the defense. On
February 26, 1957, approximately one week prior to the trial
date, Dr. Hannah reported the following to Arveson, the lawyer
for John Zimmerman:
The one feature of the case which bothers me more than any
other... is the fact that this boy of 20 years of age has an aneurysm,
which means a dilatation of the aorta and the arch of the aorta....
Of course an aneurysm or dilatation of the aorta in a boy of this age
is a serious matter as far as his life. This aneurysm... might rup-
ture with further dilatation and this would cause his death.17
Dr. Hannah, lacking a pre-accident x-ray, could not deter-
mine whether the aneurysm was caused by the accident, but
later examinations indicated that it was one of the serious in-
juries suffered by Spaulding in the accident.1 8 Disclosure of the
aneurysm would have exposed the liability insurers to in-
creased loss.
The individual defendants were not informed by their law-
yers of Spaulding's life-threatening condition, nor were they
consulted about whether it should be disclosed prior to settle-
ment. Dr. Hannah's report was mentioned to at least one of
the insurers,19 but the record is unclear whether the defense
lawyers meaningfully consulted the insurance representatives
as to whether Spaulding's condition should be disclosed to him
prior to settlement. The defense lawyers probably made the
decision not to disclose on their own.
The parties apparently did not contemplate any recovery
beyond the policy limits. Two circumstances support this con-
clusion. First, the accident involved residents of a rural farm
area with very traditional values at a time when attitudes to-
ward litigation were very different from today's. Second, mem-
bers of the Ledermann and Zimmerman families were in the
position of being both plaintiffs and defendants to the claims of
each other. In 1957, doctrines of contributory and imputed
negligence, which operated as a complete bar, posed risks to
the recovery of members of one family against the other; jurors
might determine that the claims of members of both families
were barred or uphold the claims of one family against the
17. Spaulding, 116 N.W.2d at 707 (quoting trial court's memorandum).
18. The trial court assumed for the purpose of its decision that the aneu-
rysm was caused by the accident. See id. at 708. Dr. Cain's review of x-rays
taken immediately after the accident and some time later indicates that the
aneurysm developed after the accident. See id.
19. See Record on Appeal, supra note 2, at 87.
19981
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other.20 Under these circumstances, the parents in each family
were reluctant to make claims against the personal assets of
the other family for a number of reasons, including fear of re-
ciprocal exposure.21
The claim of David Spaulding was less problematic on the
merits than those of the accident victims related to their driv-
ers. First, Spaulding could not be charged with contributory or
imputed negligence because he was a non-negligent passenger
who had no family relationship to the owner or driver of either
vehicle. Second, Minnesota did not have a guest statute re-
stricting the liability of a passenger to an auto host, and there-
fore his claim did not rest upon proof of gross negligence or
recklessness by the host, Zimmerman. 22
The fact that David had a life-threatening condition was
never communicated to him or his family by the defense attor-
neys, the defendants, or Dr. Hannah. The lawyers for the par-
ties conducted settlement negotiations in which no mention of
the aneurysm was made. Nor did the defense lawyers make
any statements at the settlement conference concerning
Spaulding's "specific injuries."
At the conference, held the day before the trial was sched-
uled to begin, the various claims involving the Zimmerman and
Ledermann families and their liability insurers were settled
for a total of approximately $40,000 in insurance payments to
the victims.23 At that time, the wrongful death limit in Minne-
sota was $15,000 and it was not uncommon for auto insurance
to have total accident coverage of $50,000 or less. David
Spaulding's claim was settled for $6,500 and, because Spauld-
ing was a minor, a petition requesting court approval of the
20. For a discussion of contributory and imputed negligence, see W. PAGE
KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 65, at 451-62(5th ed. 1984) (contributory negligence as a complete bar to recovery prior to
advent of comparative fault regimes in most states); id. § 73, at 522-27
(negligence of driver imputed to family member in some jurisdictions).
21. Defendants' argument on appeal that "insurance limits as well as
physical injuries formed the basis for settlement" supports our view that set-
tlement discussions were conducted on the assumption that claimants' recov-
ery would be within the limits of the policies. Spaulding, 116 N.W.2d at 707,
711; see also Record on Appeal, supra note 2, at 86.
22. See Milkovich v. Saari, 203 N.W.2d 408 (Minn. 1973) (en banc)(holding that Minnesota, which has no guest statute, will apply Minnesota law
to an action in its courts between an Ontario passenger and driver who were
involved in an accident in Minnesota; the Ontario statute would have required
proof of gross negligence).
23. Telephone Interview with Dr. Florian Ledermann, supra note 3.
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settlement was filed by Roberts, Spaulding's lawyer. A copy of
the petition was sent to the defense lawyers.
Almost two years after the aneurysm was discovered by
the defense medical expert, Dr. Hannah, David Spaulding was
required to have a medical examination in connection with his
military reserve obligations. He returned to Dr. Cain, his fam-
ily physician, for this purpose. On January 24, 1959, Dr. Cain
discovered the aortic aneurysm and made arrangements for
immediate corrective surgery by a specialist. The surgery re-
paired the aneurysm, but Spaulding suffered permanent and
severe speech loss, probably as a result of the corrective treat-
ment.
Spaulding, now an adult, brought the present proceeding
to set aside the earlier settlement, initially arguing mutual
mistake of fact. The defense lawyers, by producing Dr. Han-
nah's report, established that there had been no mutual mis-
take of fact, since at the time of settlement they knew of the
injury of which plaintiff was ignorant. Spaulding's amended
complaint then relied on fraudulent concealment and duty to
disclose to the court.
In response to the fraud claim, the defense lawyers pro-
duced evidence to the effect that there had been no discussion
of "specific injuries" during the settlement conference. Since
defendants and their lawyers had made no false statements to
induce the settlement, the trial court found, it could not be set
aside on grounds of fraud. The trial court, without citing or dis-
cussing applicable ethics rules, concluded that the defendants'
lawyers acted in "good faith,"24 that there was no fraudulent
concealment, and that, because of the adversary relationship,
"no rule required or duty rested upon defendants or their rep-
resentatives to disclose [their knowledge of the aneurysm]."25
The adversary relationship, however, had ended when the
petition for approval of the settlement was presented to the
court for the required approval. The defendants' concealment
from the court at the time of the petition provided a discretion-
ary basis for setting aside the settlement: "[D]efendants' failure
to act affirmatively [to correct the factual inaccuracy of the pe-
tition by supplying information they alone had concerning the
extent of plaintiffs injuries], after having been given a copy of
24. The trial court's memorandum stated: "There is no doubt of the good
faith of both defendants' counsel." Spaulding, 116 N.W.2d at 708.
25. Id.
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[the petition] ..., can only be defendants' decision to take a cal-
culated risk that the settlement would be final."26
The Minnesota Supreme Court, after quoting extensively
from the trial court's memorandum decision, affirmed the order
setting aside the settlement. Under Minnesota law, the court
held, the trial court had discretion to set aside its approval of a
settlement involving a minor's personal injury when it was
shown that the minor had sustained injuries not known or con-
sidered by the court. The only reference to the legal or ethical
obligations of the defense lawyers under the circumstances was
a cryptic sentence: "While no canon of ethics or legal obligation
may have required [defendants' lawyers] to inform plaintiff or
his counsel..., or to advise the court therein, it did become ob-
vious to them at the time, that the settlement then made did
not contemplate or take into consideration the disability de-
scribed."27 The case was remanded for a new trial.
A generation of law teachers and students has discussed
the many issues raised by Spaulding v. Zimmerman on the ba-
sis of the limited facts and holdings contained in the trial
court's memorandum and the state supreme court's brief af-
firming opinion. Principal emphasis is usually placed on the
tension between the obligations of the lawyer's adversary role
and the moral obligations of an actor to protect third persons
from harm: is a lawyer acting for a client required to maintain
a client's confidential information even if doing so will risk the
sacrifice of an innocent human life?
Our discussion of the case will consider both this and the
following questions: (1) How would the case have been decided
if Spaulding had been twenty-one rather than twenty years old
at the time of settlement or if the age of majority in Minnesota
had already been lowered to eighteen?2 8 (2) Was the court cor-
rect, as of 1957, in stating that "no canon of ethics or legal obli-
gation" required defendants or their lawyers to inform
Spaulding or his counsel of Spaulding's life-threatening injury?
Under the ethics rules or other law, was disclosure permitted
26. Id.
27. Id. at 710.
28. Minnesota lowered the age of majority from 21 to 18 years of age in
1973. Act of May 24, 1973, ch. 725, § 84, Minn. Laws 2082 (effective June 1,
1973).
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even if not required? (3) Would the same answer be given un-
der the current law of lawyering and civil procedure? (4) Were
the defense lawyers, in 1957 or today, required to consult with
their clients before making the decision not to disclose? If so,
what options are open to a defense lawyer faced with the situa-
tion created by Dr. Hannah's medical report? And (5), a re-
lated question, who was (or were) the client (or clients) that the
defense lawyers should have consulted?
A. CONCEALMENT FROM THE COURT RESULTING IN REcIsSION
OF A MINOR'S SETTLEMENT
Viewed superficially, the court reaches a just result in
Spaulding: David Spaulding is permitted to recover for the full
extent of his injuries.29 After his case was remanded, a new
and larger settlement of unknown amount was entered into.30
Yet, there is also undeniably a dark side to Spaulding. The de-
cision does not recognize any legal or ethical obligation of can-
dor or fairness, on the part of a settling party or that party's
lawyer, to an opposing party in a settlement negotiation, even
in the extreme situation in which innocent human life is at
stake. Worse yet, the holding necessarily implies that a law-
yer, absent client consent, cannot volunteer information to pro-
tect the opposing party's life without risking professional disci-
pline. It is these harsh implications that make Spaulding such
a gut-wrenching case for law students.
Judge Rogosheske, the trial judge in Spaulding,31 stated in
his memorandum decision that "the issue is exceedingly close,
[which] can best be underscored by disclosing the Court's vac-
illation during deliberations."32 The usual grounds for setting
aside a contract-mutual mistake and fraud-were not pres-
29. Because the settlement was set aside and the case remanded for a
new trial, Spaulding was given the opportunity for a new assessment of the
damages he suffered. The result was a new settlement for an additional (but
unknown) amount.
30. Telephone Interviews by Lori P. Knowles with Richard L. Pemberton
and Robert Gislason (Sept. 1997).
31. Judge Rogosheske had been elevated to the Minnesota Supreme
Court by the time the Spaulding case reached that court; as Justice he did not
participate in the Supreme Court's decision. However, the high court may
have been reluctant to reverse the earlier decision of a new colleague, and
therefore Justice Rogosheske's presence on the court could have influenced
the outcome of the case on appeal.
32. Record on Appeal, supra note 2, at 129 (Judge Rogosheske's memo-
randum opinion).
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ent. Instead, Spaulding's failure to learn the full scope of his
injuries was due to the "ignorance or incompetence" of his law-
yer, Roberts, who failed "to use available rules of discovery" to
obtain Dr. Hannah's report.33 In the absence of a discovery re-
quest, defendants were under no procedural obligation to pro-
vide Dr. Hannah's report to the opposing party.
Several factors may have contributed to the failure of
Spaulding's lawyer to request Dr. Hannah's report. First, Rob-
erts was a young lawyer at the beginning of his legal career,
and his inexperience may have led him not to request the re-
port or question Arveson concerning its content.34 Second, as
Roberts later stated in an affidavit, he inferred from defen-
dants' silence concerning Dr. Hannah's report that it merely
repeated the information he had obtained from Spaulding's
treating physicians. 35 And third, requesting the report might
have led to disclosure of a report of one of the plaintiffs physi-
cians that could have created a risk the settlement would not
obtain judicial approval.3 6
Having canvassed and rejected the possible contractual
and procedural arguments for vacating the settlement, Judge
Rogosheske grasped at the slim thread of plaintiffs argument
that the defendants "had a legal and moral duty to disclose the
33. The trial court's memorandum mentioned "the failure of plaintiffs
counsel to use available rules of discovery" to obtain Dr. Hannah's report; and
later referred to "plaintiffs ignorance or... incompetence." Spaulding v.
Zimmerman, 116 N.W.2d 704, 709 (Minn. 1962); Record on Appeal, supra note
2, at 131, 133.
34. Telephone Interview with Justice Walter F. Rogosheske (Retired), su-
pra note 15.
35. Record on Appeal, supra note 2, at 90.
36. The Record on Appeal reveals that Dr. Blake, one of the physicians
who examined Spaulding before the trial, submitted a report to Roberts stat-
ing that the case should not be settled for another year or so, until the extent
of Spaulding's brain injuries could be determined. Record on Appeal, supra
note 2, at 38-39. If the trial judge had received this report, he might not have
approved the settlement, which either the Spaulding family, or Roberts, or
both, wanted to enter into in March 1957. Roberts' failure to request a copy of
Dr. Hannah's report was clearly a tactical error which left him open to a claim
for professional negligence, a conflicting interest with his client that explains
his replacement as Spaulding's attorney shortly after the proceeding to set
aside the earlier judgment was filed. On appeal, defendants argued that the
plaintiffs concealment of Dr. Blake's report should bar Spaulding's effort to
set aside the settlement. The court rejected the argument, holding that an-
other report prepared by Dr. Blake, which was submitted to the court, ade-
quately indicated the uncertainty concerning the extent of Spaulding's brain
injuries. See Spaulding, 116 N.W.2d at 710-11.
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aneurysm to the court."37 Since Spaulding was a minor at the
time of the accident, the trial court had to approve any settle-
ment made on his behalf; once the parties had agreed, they
were no longer in an adversary relationship. Thus, although
the settlement petition was prepared and submitted by Rob-
erts, Spaulding's lawyer, it was treated as a joint petition of
both parties.3S In this circumstance, the defense lawyers, as
officers of the court, took a "calculated risk" that the settlement
would be set aside when they concealed from the court the true
facts concerning the extent of the minor's injury. The court ex-
ercised its discretionary powers and vacated the settlement on
this narrow ground.
Aside from a passing critique of Roberts for failing to dis-
cover the information contained in the defense medical report,
Judge Rogosheske did not criticize the lawyers involved or
elaborate on their legal or ethical obligations to others. Al-
though Judge Rogosheske described the defense lawyers'
"concealment" of the aneurysm as "less than full performance"
of their duties to the court, he also went out of his way to state
that the defense lawyers had acted in "good faith."39 The risk
that their failure to inform the court of the actual injuries
would be discovered had in fact materialized, with the result
that the court had discretion to set aside the settlement. The
court viewed the defense lawyers' decision to conceal the medi-
cal report not as a violation of legal duty to an opposing party,
but rather as a tactical or strategic move similar to advising a
client in a particular situation concerning "efficient breach"-
that breaking a contract in a particular situation would be less
costly than performing.40
Judge Rogosheske's memorandum decision makes it clear
that he would have reached a contrary conclusion were it not
for Spaulding's minority status:
By reason of the failure of plaintiffs counsel to use available rules of
discovery, plaintiffs doctor and all his representatives did not learn
that defendants and their agents knew of [the aneurysm's] existence
and possible serious consequences. Except for the character of the
concealment in the light of plaintiffs minority, the Court would, I be-
37. Record on Appeal, supra note 2, at 108.
38. See Spaulding, 116 N.W.2d at 709.
39. Id-
40. For discussion of the concept of efficient breach, see RICHARD A.
POSNER, ECoNoImc ANALYSIS OF LAW 131-34, 142, 153 (5th ed. 1998) (arguing
that "contract law in general [is] an inappropriate area in which to enforce
moral (insofar as they may be distinct from economic) principles").
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lieve, be justified in denying plaintiffs motion to vacate, leaving him
to whatever questionable remedy he may have against his doctor and
against his lawyer.
To hold that the concealment was not of such character as to re-
sult in an unconscionable advantage over plaintiffs ignorance or mis-
take, would be to penalize innocence and incompetence and reward
less than full performance of an officer of the Court's duty to make
full disclosure to the Court when applying for approval in minor set-
tlement proceedings.
4
'
One is left with the inescapable conclusion that, had David
Spaulding been sixteen days older when the court approved the
settlement, or had the events occurred after Minnesota had
lowered the age of majority to eighteen,42 he would have been
left to recover for his harm from his lawyer and doctor for pos-
sible professional negligence.4 3
B. THE LAWYER'S DUTY NOT TO DISCLOSE CONFIDENTIAL
CLIENT INFORMATION TO AN OPPOSING PARTY
The opinion in the Spaulding case states a bare conclu-
sion-that an advocate has no legal or ethical duty to disclose
confidential client information to the opposing party-but fails
to state underlying principles, or cite judicial decisions or rules,
in support of this proposition. The court's silence and lack of
reasoning stimulate law students to reflect on the premises of
the adversary system and the content of applicable rules of pro-
fessional conduct and of civil procedure.
41. Spaulding, 116 N.W.2d at 709.
42. Spaulding was born on May 24, 1936 and the settlement agreement
was approved by the court on May 8, 1957, 16 days before his 21st birthday.
Record on Appeal, supra note 2, at 15.
43. If Spaulding had been an adult at the time the settlement was ap-
proved, he (or, if he had died of the unrevealed aneurysm, his family) would
have had no legal recompense other than a possible action for professional
malpractice against lawyer Roberts or Spaulding's physicians. An adult's set-
tlement of a personal injury claim bars any future claim arising out of the
same facts. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 18-20 (1982) (claim
preclusion). A subsequent fraud claim would be available only if the settle-
ment was induced by material false representations and detrimental reliance,
which was not the case in Spaulding. Moreover, any professional malpractice
claim under the circumstances would have been problematic in terms of li-
ability and difficult to prosecute for practical reasons. It is not clear that the
facts would have supported a malpractice claim against Spaulding's physi-
cians. Moreover, a claim against any of the professionals involved would have
depended upon the plaintiff finding a lawyer willing to take the case and the
availability of experts willing to testify concerning professional negligence-
both uncertain prospects in rural Minnesota in the 1950s.
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1. The lawyer's adversary role
The adversary system posits that the advocate advances
the objectives of a client "within the bounds of the law."44 The
premises underlying one longstanding conception of the law-
yer's role are frequently summarized as the principles of parti-
sanship and moral non-accountability. 45 Partisanship, often
referred to as "zeal," is expressed in a lawyer's duty to advance
a client's goals by committed and diligent effort. Doing so in-
volves indifference or opposition to the interests of opposing
parties and witnesses. At its extreme, total commitment to cli-
ent extends to counseling functions as well as litigation, and
involves treating those other than the client as strangers, if not
enemies. The lawyer becomes a single-minded mercenary, a
"hired gun."
Moral non-accountability, sometimes referred to as "moral
neutrality," reflects the proposition that a lawyer, acting
within the role contemplated by the adversary process, is only
doing what the lawyer is supposed to be doing in assisting a
client to achieve a desired objective. If the client's goals, and
the means chosen to advance them, are lawful, the neutrality
proposition asserts that the lawyer should not be subject to
moral criticism even though the goal or the means employed
are viewed by others as immoral and would be so viewed by the
lawyer himself in the lawyer's "off-duty" life.46
44. Canon 15 of the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics stated that "the
great trust of the lawyer is to be performed within and not without the bounds
of the law." CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Canon 15 (1908). A similar
formulation is part of the Lawyer's Oath that is traditionally used in bar ad-
mission ceremonies in a number of states. Canon 7 of the ABA Model Rules of
Professional Conduct was entitled: "A Lawyer Should Represent a Client
Zealously Within the Bounds of the Law." See also MODEL CODE OF PRO-
FESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Ethical Considerations 7-1 to 7-3 (1969).
45. Leading discussions of the premises of the adversary role include:
Luban, supra note 7; Stephen L. Pepper, The Lawyer's Amoral Ethical Role: A
Defense, A Problem, and Some Possibilities, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 613;
Murray L. Schwartz, The Professionalism and Accountability of Lawyers, 66
CAL. L. REV. 669 (1978); Murray L. Schwartz, The Zeal of the Civil Advocate,
1983 AMf. B. FOUND. RES. J. 543.
46. Ted Schneyer persuasively argues that the "standard conception" of
adversary representation advanced by some academic writers is only one of
several competing visions of the lawyer's role, not the only conception permis-
sible under ethics codes. The standard conception fails to take account of the
degree of discretion conferred on lawyers by ethics rules and other law. See
Ted Schneyer, Moral Philosophy's Standard Misconception of Legal Ethics,
1984 WIS. L. REV. 1529, 1534-43; Ted Schneyer, Some Sympathy for the Hired
Gun, 41 J. LEGAL EDUC. 11 (1991). Schneyer asks what it means operation-
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Under this standard conception of total commitment to cli-
ent within the bounds of law, the strategic decision not to dis-
close Spaulding's life-threatening condition to him merely in-
volves an adversary taking advantage of the incompetence or
inexperience of Spaulding's lawyer. The adversary system
cannot operate effectively, it is argued, if parties in civil litiga-
tion are protected against the failures of their lawyers by any-
thing other than malpractice liability on the part of the care-
less lawyer.4 7
The "adversary system excuse" provides a moral justifica-
tion for behavior that in other contexts might be viewed as
immoral. The lawyer's moral universe is simplified by allowing
the lawyer to say, "I was only doing my job." This attempt to
justify amoral or immoral lawyer conduct has been subject to
justifiable criticism, and extreme versions of it are unsound for
a number of reasons.4 8 Despite this criticism, the prevalent
adversary ethic means that a lawyer may not disclose confiden-
tial client information to an opposing party unless doing so
would advance the client's interests, the situation falls within
an established exception to the lawyer's professional duty of
confidentiality, or the client consents to the disclosure. The
question even arises, as the defense lawyers argued in Spauld-
ing, whether the relevant ethical rules required them to remain
silent concerning the risk to Spaulding's life.49
ally to be immune from moral criticism: by whom, in what contexts, and with
what consequences? As a practical matter, recognition of moral immunity of a
lawyer when acting in the professional role is likely to be limited to those in
the legal profession who subscribe to this conception of the lawyer's role.
47. See, e.g., Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 633-34 (1962)
(dismissing FELA claim for failure of plaintiffs lawyer to attend a pretrial
conference because the parties were bound by the acts or omissions of their
lawyers--"any other notion would be wholly inconsistent with our system of
representative litigation.").
48. For an elaboration of the arguments, see supra notes 45-46 and mate-
rials cited therein; see also Andrew L. Kaufinan, A Commentary on Pepper's
"The Lawyer's Amoral Ethical Role," 1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 651; David
Luban The Lysistratian Prerogative: A Response to Stephen Pepper, 1986 AM.
B. FOUND. RES. J. 637.
49. See Record on Appeal, supra note 2, at 132. The Dead Bodies Case is
another much-discussed situation raising this issue. Lawyers for a murder
defendant learned from him that he had also killed two young women and
hidden their bodies in remote locations. The lawyers confirmed his story by
finding and observing the bodies. They remained silent in response to in-
quiries from a grieving parent concerned about the missing daughter. The
details later became public when, in connection with an insanity defense, the
defendant described the series of murders in his testimony. A huge public
outcry ensued. Criminal charges, for violating a New York law requiring a
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2. The rules of professional ethics in 1957 and today
In Minnesota, as in other states, the Canons of Profes-
sional Ethics (as amended from time to time) provided the
framework for determining the propriety of professional con-
duct at the time of the Spaulding settlement in 1957.5o The
Canons were expressed in general language of professional
duty and morality. Much more than today's lawyer codes, they
mingled the minimum obligations required to avoid profes-
sional discipline with the morality of aspiration.51 Under this
regime, no client or lawyer crime or fraud was involved in
failing to disclose the content of Dr. Hannah's report.52
decent burial and a report of deaths that occur without medical attention,
were brought against one of the lawyers. The dismissal of the criminal
charges was affirmed on appeal. See People v. Belge, 359 N.E.2d 377 (N.Y.
1976) (per curiam). The lawyers' failure to disclose was found to be the re-
quired response under state ethics rules. See N.Y. State Bar Ass'n Comm. on
Prof. Ethics, Op. 479 (1978).
50. The American Bar Association Canons of Professional Ethics, initially
adopted by the ABA in 1908, provided ethical guidance to state courts ruling
on lawyer conduct until they were displaced in 1970 by widespread state
adoption of the ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility. The Canons
are reprinted in several compilations of standards governing the professional
conduct of lawyers. See THOMAS D. MORGAN & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, 1998
SELECTED STANDARDS ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 616-28 [hereinafter
MORGAN & ROTUNDA STANDARDS]. The Canons were expanded by amend-
ment from 1908 to 1969. A provision dealing directly with a lawyer's duty to
maintain confidentiality of client information was first adopted in 1928. ABA
CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Canon 37 (1928).
51. Scholars have frequently commented on the evolution of the profes-
sion's codes from general language, often cast in moral and aspirational
terms, to a quasi-criminal code of professional discipline. The initial step was
taken in 1969 when the ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility sepa-
rated "ethical considerations" from "disciplinary rules." MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1969). The 1983 ABA Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct continued the "de-moralization" and "legalization" of the law-
yer codes under the leadership of Professor Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., the re-
porter on the ABA's Model Rules project. Professor Hazard later served as
Director of the American Law Institute during the lengthy period of develop-
ment of the ALI's Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers. For discussion
of this evolution of ethics codes and Professor Hazard's role in it, see David
Luban & Michael Millemann, Good Judgment: Ethics Teaching in Dark
Times, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 31, 41-53 (1995). Although "ethics" in the
sense of professional obligation was more sharply distinguished from "law" in
the 1950s than it is today, it is worth emphasizing that the mandatory duties
stated in the Canons were intended to, and did, serve as the basis for profes-
sional discipline.
52. One could argue that Zimmerman, having put Spaulding in peril by
his driving, had an affirmative obligation to protect him from further harm.
See infra notes 81-87 and accompanying text.
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Putting aside permissive provisions dealing with per-
suading a client to do the right thing, or seeking withdrawal if
the client did not,53 the Canons contained three provisions re-
lating to disclosure of information to an adversary or third
party: Canon 37 required a lawyer "to preserve his client's con-
fidences," a duty that was modified only by permission to dis-
close either the "announced intention of a client to commit a
crime" or information necessary to defend the lawyer when
"accused by his client." Moreover, the "warm zeal" required by
Canon 15 was qualified by the obligation to avoid "fraud and
chicane" and an appeal to the lawyer to follow the dictates of
conscience. Finally, Canon 41 required rectification of "fraud
or deception.., unjustly imposed upon a court or a party." Ju-
dicial decisions required a lawyer to take reasonable steps to
prevent a prospective client fraud at the risk of civil liability or
other sanctions, suggesting that silent withdrawal was an in-
sufficient response and disclosure was sometimes required.54
Thus, under the Canons, the duty of confidentiality was over-
ridden by a strong countervailing duty of disclosure in various
circumstances.
The Spaulding case holds that the defense lawyers had
disclosure obligations to the trial court when the settlement
was made, but solely because Spaulding was a minor at the
time.55 However, the effort by Minnesota law to protect a mi-
53. Canon 15 stated that a lawyer "must obey his own conscience and not
that of his client." Canon 22, dealing with candor and fairness to the court
and other lawyers, stated that the lawyer was "an officer of the law
charged... with the duty of aiding in the administration of justice." Canon
44 permitted withdrawal "when the client insists upon an unjust or immoral
course in the conduct of his case."
54. The sparse case law supporting this proposition primarily dates from
the period following the shift in 1970 from the Canons to the Model Code of
Professional Responsibility. See, e.g., SEC v. National Student Mktg. Corp.,
457 F. Supp. 682 (D.D.C. 1978) (requiring a lawyer to take reasonable steps to
prevent a client fraud on investors in an injunction proceeding by the SEC,
accompanied by settlement of contemporaneous private civil actions); Roberts
v. Ball, Hunt, Hart, Brown, & Baerwitz, 128 Cal. Rptr. 901 (Cal. Ct. App.
1976) (complaint stating that a lawyer omitted a material fact from a legal
opinion directed to a person with whom the client sought a loan stated a cause
of action for negligent misrepresentation). See generally Geoffrey C. Hazard,
Jr., Rectification of Client Fraud: Death and Revival of a Professional Norm,
33 EMORY L.J. 271 (1984); infra note 174 (citing caselaw).
55. Spaulding v. Zimmerman, 116 N.W.2d 704, 709-10 (Minn. 1962). An
analogous situation in which professional rules require disclosure to a court of
information adverse to a client's interest is one in which a lawyer seeks ex
parte relief affecting third persons. See MODEL RULES, supra note 10, Rule
3.3(e) (requiring candor to the tribunal in ex parte proceedings).
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nor's interests through the mechanism of court approval of set-
tlement does not extend to adult litigants who settle their per-
sonal injury claims.56 Spaulding does not attempt to explain
the moral principles or societal interests that justify disclosure
to the court but not disclosure to the person whose life is in
jeopardy. Such a distinction cannot be based on general moral
principles, but only on an adversary system justification that
demands a greater degree of candor to the court than to an op-
posing party.57 So long as the proceeding is adversary in char-
acter and an application to the court is not involved, a party
and the party's lawyer may give preference to their own finan-
cial interests over the opposing party's interest in survival.
Today, Minnesota is one of the forty-two jurisdictions that
base their lawyer code on a version of the 1983 Model Rules of
Professional Conduct.58 If the Spaulding case arose in Minne-
sota under the Model Rules, Spaulding would be treated as an
adult and no court approval of the parties' private settlement
would be required. Therefore, the question of candor to the
court raised by treating the petition for approval as a joint ap-
plication of both parties would not arise. Although Minnesota,
like most other states, has broadened the exceptions to confi-
dentiality beyond the narrow confines of ABA Model Rule
1.6(b), disclosure to protect third-party interests is permitted
only to prevent a client crime or fraud, or to rectify a prior cli-
ent crime or fraud in which the lawyer's services have been
used.59 Because there is no client crime or fraud on the
Spaulding facts, disclosure would not be permitted under the
literal text of Minnesota's current ethics code.60
56. See supra note 43.
57. The distinction between candor to the court and candor to a third per-
son is a central feature of the Model Rules. Rule 3.3(a) requires disclosure to
the court to protect the integrity of judicial process. Disclosure of confidential
client information is required even if disclosure is opposed by and will harm
the client. This disclosure requirement explicitly trumps the confidentiality
duty of Rule 1.6(a). On the other hand, Rule 4.1(b), if taken literally, forbids
disclosure to third persons unless the situation falls within the narrow excep-
tions expressed in Rule 1.6(b). The contrast is most dramatic with respect to
client fraud: fraud on a tribunal must be disclosed; fraud on a third person
cannot be disclosed. See also ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Respon-
sibility, Formal Ops. 94-387 (1994) and 95-397 (1995).
58. See ABA/BNA Manual of Professional Conduct § 01:3 (listing the
dates of state adoption of the Model Rules).
59. MINN. RULEs OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucT Rulel.6(b)(3).
60. Two recent ABA ethics opinions illustrate the Model Rule distinction,
in civil litigation, between required disclosure to the court and voluntary dis-
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3. Rules of civil procedure in 1957 and today
Changes in the rules governing discovery and disclosure of
information in civil litigation have affected disclosure obliga-
tions more than changes in ethics rules. Minnesota adopted
civil procedure rules modeled on the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure only in 1952.61 In 1957, many Minnesota trial law-
yers were still unfamiliar with the new regime of broad discov-
ery.62 The physician-patient privilege was taken very seriously
at the time, and was not routinely waived by a plaintiff who
brought a personal injury action. Prior to 1952, the plaintiff
could request and obtain the report of a physician whom the
defense had retained to examine the plaintiff, but the request
might have the effect of waiving the privilege with respect to
the plaintiffs medical records. This regime was modified by
Rule 35 of the new rules, permitting a party to require an ex-
amination and providing for the report's disclosure to the ex-
amined party on specific request.63 Since no such request was
made in Spaulding, the Minnesota court was correct in con-
cluding that state procedural law did not require defense law-
yers to disclose Dr. Hannah's report to the plaintiff.
closure to the adverse party. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Re-
sponsibility, Formal Ops. 94-387 (1994) and 95-397 (1995). The first, Opinion
94-387, concludes that a lawyer, knowing that the statute of limitations has
run on a claim asserted by the opposing party, may negotiate a settlement
with that party without disclosing that the claim is barred. There is no ethi-
cal obligation to disclose this information. On the other hand, Opinion 95-397
concludes that when the lawyer's client has died after a settlement offer has
been received, but prior to response, the lawyer must disclose this fact be-
cause the claim is transferred to a new party-the personal representative-
who may or may not be the lawyer's client. Misrepresentation to the court
would be involved in accepting the offer without disclosing the information,
which should also be noticed to the opposing party. At this point, the de-
ceased client's lawyer no longer has authority to accept the offer as the client's
agent. See ABA Formal Op. 95-397; cf Virzi v. Grand Trunk Warehouse &
Cold Storage Co., 571 F. Supp. 507, 511 (E.D. Mich. 1983) (setting aside alle-
gations of concealment of death of plaintiff during settlement of a personal
injury claim; holding that failure to substitute the proper party under Rule 25
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure led the court to "enter an order of set-
tlement for a non-existent party").
61. MINN. R. CIV. P. (effective Jan. 1, 1952).
62. The information in this paragraph is drawn largely from conversa-
tions of Roger C. Cramton with Professor John J. Cound of the University of
MAinnesota Law School.
63. MINN. R. CIV. P. 35.02. Under the regime of broad discovery, the
plaintiffs physician-patient privilege is essentially waived by the plaintiff put-
ting physical condition in issue in the law suit.
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Today, a number of states, but not Minnesota, have
adopted procedural rules imposing an affirmative duty on a
civil litigant to disclose to the adverse party material informa-
tion relating to the case.64 Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure also takes this course.65 Although many federal dis-
trict courts have opted out of Rule 26, it is applied in the Dis-
trict of Minnesota. 66 In a jurisdiction in which these affirma-
tive obligations to disclose exist, defendants and their lawyers
would be obliged to reveal to a plaintiff the identity of indi-
viduals "likely to have discoverable information," along with all
documents relevant to the merits and any material supporting
damages that are claimed. 67
Disclosure provisions of this sort, enforced by fear of incur-
ring judicial displeasure or sanctions in the proceeding, have a
more powerful effect on lawyer behavior in litigation than the
provisions of ethics codes concerning abusive litigation con-
duct. The latter provisions are cast in general terms, and in-
clude qualifiers that make them largely unenforceable in disci-
pline proceedings and other contexts. 6s Here again, there is an
important lesson. Because procedural requirements tend to be
more specific and more frequently enforced than the corre-
sponding provisions of ethics codes, they have a much more
powerful effect on lawyer behavior than the ethics codes.
64. See Lauren Y. Robel, Mandatory Disclosure and Local Abrogation: In
Search of a Theory for Optional Rules, 14 Rev. Litig. 49 (1994).
65. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a) (as amended in 1993).
66. See Robel, supra note 64, for a discussion of local rules opting out of
Rule 26. Professor John J. Cound has informed the authors that the United
States District Court of Minnesota has no local rule displacing Rule 26, which
is in effect in the Minnesota federal court.
67. FED. R. C1V. P. 26(a) (as amended in 1993).
68. See, e.g., MODEL RULES, supra note 10, Rule 3.1 (dealing with frivo-
lous assertions), Rule 3.2 (dealing with delay as a tactic), and Rule 3.4(d)
(dealing with discovery abuse), which are stated in vague terms and contain
clauses that make their application in disciplinary proceedings difficult. For
example, Rule 3.2 permits lawyer tactics that cause delay if they are
"consistent with the interests of the client;" and Rule 4.4 prohibits an attorney
from "embarrass[ing], delay[ing] or burden[ing] a third person," only when
they "have no substantial other purpose." Consequently, professional disci-
pline for excessive zeal in civil litigation is virtually nonexistent. Yet similar
conduct is often met, in both federal and state court proceedings, with judicial
sanctions that are a more powerful deterrent. Since 1983, when it was stiff-
ened, Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and its state analogs
have had a much greater impact on lawyer conduct than the comparable pro-
visions of state ethics codes.
1998]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
However, the issue raised by the Spaulding facts does not
appear to fall within the ambit of disclosure required by cur-
rent Rule 26. A party is required to disclose the identity and
report of an expert witness "who may be used at trial," but this
does not include those of an expert upon whom the party does
not plan to rely. Dr. Hannah's report confirms the injuries dis-
covered by the plaintiffs experts and adds an additional seri-
ous injury. Since Dr. Hannah's testimony is likely to be helpful
only to plaintiff Spaulding, it is improbable that defense law-
yers would list him as an expert who might be used at trial.
Rule 35 would be available to the plaintiff, but the rule re-
quires the party against whom a required physical examina-
tion is made to request a copy of the examiner's report.69 Thus
it is clear that the rules of civil procedure, both today's and
those in effect at the time of Spaulding, fail to provide satisfac-
tory answers to the difficult questions raised by the case.
This analysis of Spaulding leads to two unsettling conclu-
sions: First, the settlement would not have been set aside if
Spaulding had reached the age of majority when it was made.
Second, the rules of legal ethics and procedural law in effect in
Minnesota in 1957 did not require the defense lawyers to dis-
close Spaulding's life-threatening condition to him. In fact,
such disclosure was probably prohibited in the absence of client
consent. Moreover, the same conclusions would be reached
under the ethics and procedural rules in effect in most states
today.
C. THE LAWYER'S CRUCIAL ROLE AS COUNSELOR
The Spaulding case forces law students to grapple with
the harsh reality that, absent explicit consent from the client,
the lawyer's partisan role in the adversary system may prevent
a lawyer from doing the right thing. Outside the narrow excep-
tions to the professional duty of confidentiality, the startling
rule is that lawyers in the position of the defense attorneys in
Spaulding may not inform the plaintiff that he has a life-
threatening condition that needs immediate attention. Al-
though the Spaulding facts are unusual, similar cases have
been encountered and can be imagined-fact situations in
69. Rule 35 provides the formal mechanism by which a plaintiff, when
compelled to submit to a physical examination, may obtain the examination
report. See FED. R. Civ. P. 35. See generally Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312
U.S. 1 (1941) (holding that Rule 35 did not abridge substantive rights and was
therefore authorized by the Rules Enabling Act).
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which the lawyer's duty of confidentiality is in severe tension
with ordinary morality.70
Spaulding is the classic setting in which to consider a fun-
damental issue in the life of a lawyer: What can a good lawyer
do, under the professional ethics codes as they are today, to see
that a morally decent course of action is taken? Or, as it is
sometimes put, can a good lawyer also be a good person? This
inquiry leads to discussion of the duties and opportunities that
a lawyer has in relating to a client. Such relating typically oc-
curs in three phases: communicating with a client, counseling
the client, and, if the matter is within the client's sphere of
authority, generally deferring to the client's choice of a lawful
course of action.
1. The desirability and inevitability of moral discourse
Clients retain lawyers to get legal assistance, and this
means the lawyer needs to be fully informed concerning the
client's situation and objectives. Therefore, a critical aspect of
every lawyer's job is communication, which involves listening
to the client, inquiry by the lawyer into relevant fact and law,
and informing the client of lawful courses of action that may
achieve the client's objectives. These duties are succinctly
stated in the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct.71
Communication slides imperceptibly into counseling. The
lawyer-client relationship is a joint endeavor that normally in-
volves a legal and moral dialogue in which client and lawyer
learn from one another. The ethics rules require the lawyer to
inform the client of alternative courses of action 2 and to defer
to the client's choice of a lawful objective.73 The rules require
the lawyer to give "candid" and independent advice, permit the
lawyer to include moral and other considerations in that ad-
vice,74 and prohibit the lawyer from counseling or assisting
criminal or fraudulent conduct. 75
70. In addition to the troublesome client-fraud situation, consider the hy-
pothetical situations based on real cases that are discussed infra at text ac-
companying notes 151-53. Each involve severe tension between lawyer confi-
dentiality and ordinary morality.
71. See MODEL RULES, supra note 10, Rule 1.4 (communication); Rule 1.1
(competence); Rule 1.3 (diligence).
72. See id. Rule 1.4.
73. See id. Rule 1.2(a).
74. See id. Rule 2.1.
75. See id. Rules 1.2(d), 1.16(a).
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Although ethics codes permit a lawyer to discuss moral,
economic, political and other considerations with clients,76
some lawyers argue that lawyer-client conversations should be
largely or totally limited to "legal" matters, on which the law-
yer has special expertise. But what is "legal" in character, or
relevant to "legal advice," cannot be so easily cubby-holed.
Even the decision not to discuss "moral" or other concerns is a
moral choice with moral implications. As Thomas Shaffer and
Robert Cochran have stated, conversations between lawyers
and clients "are almost always moral" because "when clients or
their lawyers take advantage of the rules, they have decided
that they ought to take advantage. They might have decided
that they ought not to."77
In our view, the good counselor engages in a moral dia-
logue with a client concerning the rightness or goodness of
various courses of conduct28 Deciding not to introduce moral
issues is itself a moral stand, just as moral relativism qualifies
as an ethical view, even though an unsound one. Both lawyers
and their clients should be constantly asking themselves and
each other, "What is the right thing to do? What action would
a good person take?" Properly conceived, justice is not solely
the product of governmental institutions, procedures and ac-
tions-the grist of laws and lawsuits. Justice is a gift that good
76. Rule 2.1 requires a lawyer to "exercise independent judgment" and
"render candid advice." Id. Rule 2.1. It permits the lawyer, in rendering ad-
vice, "to refer not only to law but to other considerations such as moral, eco-
nomic, social and political factors, that may be relevant to the client's situa-
tion." Id.
77. THOMAS L. SHAFFER & ROBERT F. COCHRAN, JR., LAWYERS, CLIENTS,
AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 1 (1994). Shaffer and Cochran also state that
"lawyer-client decisions usually benefit some people at the expense of others,"
and that moral issues are nearly always embedded in such choices. See also
Robert P. Lawry, Damned and Damnable: A Lawyer's Moral Duties with Life
on the Line, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1641, 1642-46 (1996) (discussing Shaffer and
Cochran's conception of morality in a lawyer's decisionnaking process).
78. Cf. Robert P. Lawry, Cross-Examining the Truthful Witness: The Ideal
Within the Central Moral Tradition of Lawyering, 100 DICK. L. REv. 563
(1996); Robert P. Lawry, The Central Moral Tradition of Lawyering, 19
HOFSTRA L. REV. 311 (1990) (discussing the "the central moral tradition of
lawyering" and drawing on Professor Lon Fuller's views as expressed in the
AALS-ABA Joint Conference Report on Professional Responsibility (1958));
see also John M. A. DiPippa, Lon Fuller, The Model Code and the Model
Rules, 37 S. TEX. L. REV. 303 (1996); Thomas L. Shaffer, Legal Ethics and the
Good Client, 36 CATH. U. L. REV. 319 (1987); Thomas L. Shaffer, The Unique,
Novel and Unsound Adversary Ethic, 41 VAND. L. REV. 697, 701 (1988)
[hereinafter Shaffer, Adversary Ethic] (arguing that earlier traditions of law-
yering were modified in the twentieth century).
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people give to each other by the way they act toward one an-
other in all situations, in and out of the courtroom.
2. The primacy of human life as a moral predicate
Today, there is much dispute about moral questions and
less general agreement concerning them than at times in our
past. Yet broad agreement remains concerning the primacy of
human life in the hierarchy of values recognized by ordinary
morality.79 A strong justification, such as a threat to one's own
life or that of another, is necessary to overcome the moral duty
to act in a way that does not severely risk the life of an inno-
cent person. Does the adversary system constitute a sufficient
justification, particularly in an extreme situation that posits a
self-centered and immoral client? Are a few thousand dollars
to such a client worth the sacrifice of someone made in the im-
age of God? Given agreement about the primacy of human life
as a value, the moral issue in Spaulding should be an easy one
for lay people and moral philosophers alike.
Moral questions are illuminated through an examination
of circumstance, context and relationships.80 In considering
whether John Zimmerman, the driver of the car in which
David Spaulding was a passenger, should inform Spaulding of
his life-threatening injury, it is important to understand the
nature of the relationship between the plaintiff and the defen-
dant and the other circumstances of their interaction. A total
stranger has a moral obligation, but usually not a legal one, to
assist a person in peril, especially when rescue can be accom-
plished with little or no cost or risk and will not interfere with
rescue efforts on the part of others. 81 Yet friendship creates an
even stronger moral obligation to take action.
79. All of the world's major religions view the taking of an innocent life as
among the greatest of moral wrongs. Moral philosophies that are secular and
humanistic in character take the same position. Disagreement exists con-
cerning important details, including what constitutes innocence, self-defense,
or permissible killing (e.g., the morality of capital punishment), and whether
or what distinctions should be drawn between killing and letting die. But the
basic proposition of respect for life is more universally accepted than perhaps
any other moral tenet.
80. See HAZARD ET AL., supra note 8, at 323-25 (discussing the importance
of these factors in making moral choices); see also W. William Hodes, Intro-
duction: What Ought to Be Done-What Can Done-When the Wrong Person Is
in Jail or About to Be Executed?, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1547, 1555-63 (1996).
81 See RESTATEiENT (SEcOND) OF TORTs § 314 (1965); KEETON ET AL.,
supra note 20, § 56, at 375-77. Both sources address the common law rule
that one person owes another no duty to take active or affirmative steps for
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The Spaulding opinion tells us that Zimmerman, age nine-
teen, driving his father's car, had Spaulding, age twenty, as a
passenger. These bare facts suggest two young persons, pre-
sumably friends, who are engaged in a common endeavor.
Moreover, although it is not reflected in the opinion, the rela-
tionship between Zimmerman and Spaulding was more than
the possibility of friendship. Spaulding and his brother, both of
whom were accompanying members of the Zimmerman family
when the accident occurred, were employees of a road construc-
tion business operated by the Zimmermans.8 2 The Spauldings
were being driven home from the work site by their employer
at the end of the work day.83 The case, however, was not
brought against the Zimmermans on an enterprise liability
theory, and presumably it would have been untenable on that
approach. Nevertheless, the employment relationship, in addi-
tion to the possibility of friendship, bolsters the moral force of
an obligation to protect Spaulding from a threatened harm. 4
The moral claim was particularly strong because the risk
of harm was causally connected to Zimmerman's driving. An
actor's conduct in causing physical harm to someone, even if no
negligence is involved, creates a special relationship triggering
a duty of care. Although the common law does not impose a
general duty to rescue on persons who recognize a risk of se-
vere harm to another,8 5 it does recognize legal as well as moral
the other's protection. See also John M. Adler, Relying Upon the Reasonable-
ness of Strangers: Some Observations About the Current State of Common Law
Duties to Aid or Protect Others, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 867; Ernest J. Weinrib, The
Case for a Duty to Rescue, 90 YALE L.J. 247 (1980). Minnesota, it should be
noted, is one of the few states that has enacted a criminal statute imposing a
duty to rescue. See MINN. STAT. § 604.05.
82. See 2 Killed Friday in Car Collision, PARK REGION ECHO (Alexandria,
Minn.), Aug. 26, 1956 at 1; Telephone Interview by Lori P. Knowles with
Leona Zimmerman (Sept. 17, 1997).
83. Telephone Interview with Leona Zimmerman, supra note 82.
84. A few cases even impose a legal obligation in factual situations similar
to that in the Spaulding case. See, e.g., Farwell v. Keaton, 240 N.W.2d 217
(Mich. 1976). In Farwell, the court held that a social companion who knows
that his friend has been beaten unconscious by others has a duty to render
reasonable care under all the circumstances. "Implicit in such a common un-
dertaking is the understanding that one will render assistance to the other
when he is in peril if he can do so without endangering himself." Id. at 222.
The special relationship of employer-employee also leads to a duty of care: an
employer must take reasonable affirmative steps to assist an injured em-
ployee, at least where the injury occurred in the course of the employment.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314B (1965).
85. See Harper v. Herman, 499 N.W.2d 472 (Minn. 1993) (en banc)
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obligations on those who are a cause-in-fact of another's injury.
The most common example involves motor vehicle accidents:
every state, including Minnesota, currently has a statute re-
quiring drivers involved in an accident to stop, report, and as-
sist injured persons.8 6 Although civil liability under tort law
applying the statutory duty to assist is probably limited to the
scene of accident,87 it provides support by analogy to a moral
argument that Zimmerman had a continuing responsibility to
see that Spaulding came to no further harm from an injury
flowing from Zimmerman's prior driving.
3. The lawyer's duties of consultation with and deference to
the client
The purpose and goal of adversary representation is to ad-
vance the interests of the client; and client interests can be as-
certained only through consultation with the client.88 But pro-
fessional tradition and the exigencies of practice have led to
rules giving lawyers a sphere of autonomous decisional
authority, sometimes even in the face of contrary directions by
the client. In general, the "means" of accomplishing the "ends"
of representation fall within the decisionmaking authority allo-
cated to the lawyer.8 9 Judicial decisions authorize lawyers to
make important strategic and tactical choices without the con-
sent of their clients. This authority applies especially to deci-
sions that must be made in the client's absence or those that
(holding that defendant, the owner and operator of a private boat on a Minne-
sota lake, had no duty to warn plaintiff, a guest on the boat, that water sur-
rounding the boat was too shallow for diving).
86. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 169.09 (West 1986 & 1998 Supp.)
(requiring a driver involved in a motor vehicle accident to stop, report, and
assist injured persons). The motor vehicle statutes are a specific application
of the general rule that an actor who "knows or has reason to know that by his
conduct, he has caused such bodily harm to another as to make him helpless
and in danger of further harm [has] a duty to exercise reasonable care to pre-
vent such further harm." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 322 (1965).
87. This conclusion rests on the absence of decisions holding that the as-
sistance obligation is a continuing one, and on discussions of the question with
Professors James A. Henderson, Jr. and Aaron Twerski.
88. See MODEL RULES, supra note 10, Rule 1.2(a) (requiring a lawyer to
"abide by a client's decisions concerning the objectives of representation" and
listing some matters on which the client has decisional authority).
89. See id. (requiring a lawyer to "consult with the client as to the means
by which [the client's objectives] are to be pursued"). For discussion of the
allocation of decisionmaking authority between lawyer and client, see
RESTATEMENT OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, supra note 12, sections 32 to 34
(Proposed Final Draft No.1, 1996).
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must be made quickly during trial, such as whether to object to
a particular line of questioning.90 Notably, clients are fully
bound by their lawyers' actions under such circumstances.91
In Spaulding, however, the decision not to disclose Dr.
Hannah's report did not rightfully fall within the lawyer's
sphere of implied authority. The magnitude of the plaintiffs
injuries, probably caused by the defendants' conduct, affected
the substantive interests of all parties. The value of the plain-
tiffs claim would have been substantially larger if the more se-
rious injury had been disclosed, In addition, the plaintiffs life
was hanging in the balance. Under such circumstances, where
the decision to disclose the information involves important
substantive interests, that decision must be made by the client
and not the lawyer. In fact, a comment to Model Rule 1.2(a)
states that the lawyer, even in questions of means, "should de-
fer to the client regarding such questions as... concern for
third persons who might be adversely affected"92-- precisely the
situation in Spaulding.
a. identifying the real client in Spaulding
A lawyer has a duty to consult with a client, explore the
facts, and give legal and moral advice concerning available
courses of action. 93 Thus far, we have assumed that John
Zimmerman was consulted by his lawyer, Arveson, concerning
the action that should be taken with respect to Dr. Hannah's
report. But whom should Arveson have consulted? The an-
swer, naturally, turns on the question of whom he represented.
The defense lawyers in Spaulding were retained by the li-
ability insurers of the individual defendants, and the insurance
contract gave the insurers the right to control the defense and
90. See, e.g., Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626 (1962) (client bound
by lawyer's failure to attend a pretrial conference which led to involuntary
dismissal of client's FELA claim); Blanton v. Womancare, Inc., 696 P.2d 645,
650 (Cal. 1985) (en banc) (discussing broad authority of trial lawyer in civil
case to bind the client by lawyer's choices).
91. See Blanton, 696 P.2d at 650.
92. MODEL RULES, supra note 10, Rule 1.2 cmt. 1.
93. See id. Rule 1.4 (requiring a lawyer to keep a client reasonably in-
formed, promptly comply with reasonable requests for information, and
"explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to
make informed decisions regarding the representation"); id. Rule 2.1
(requiring the lawyer to "exercise independent professional judgment and
render candid advice," and permitting the lawyer to refer to moral and other
factors that may be relevant to the client's situation).
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to settle a claim without the insured's consent.94 Some states,
at the time of Spaulding and today, take the position that the
insured is the sole client; the insurer is a third-party payor
who has rights, flowing from the insurance contract, that affect
the litigation.95 Other states view the insured and the insurer
as co-clients in the absence of a severe conflict of interest be-
tween them; each is owed all of the duties a lawyer owes a cli-
ent.96 Under either conception, the insured is a client; the only
difference is whether or not the insurer has a full lawyer-client
relationship with defense counsel. Thus, for purposes of re-
solving the representation question in Spaulding, it makes lit-
tle difference which approach is taken. Under both views the
defense lawyer has a duty to communicate with the individual
defendant with respect to the objectives of the litigation and
even as to matters, such as the final decision on settlement, on
which the insurer has a contractual right to make the deci-
sion.97
Was John Zimmerman or his father consulted on the dis-
closure issue by Arveson, the family's lawyer? Surviving mem-
bers of the Zimmerman and Ledermann families state that
they had no knowledge that David Spaulding was suffering an
94 See William T. Barker, Insurance Defense Ethics and the Liability In-
surance Bargain, 4 CONN. INS. L.J. 75, 83-84 (1997); Robert H. Jerry, II, Con-
sent, Contract, and the Responsibilities of Insurance Defense Counsel, 4
CONN. INS. L.J. 153, 163-64 (1997).
95. See RESTATEMENT OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, supra note 12, § 215
(Compensation or Direction by Third Persons) (dealing with the insured-
insurer-defense counsel triangle). The comments and reporter's notes contain
a brief discussion of the issues and cite principal articles and authorities. For
the argument that the insured should be considered as the sole client, see
Robert O'Malley, Ethics Principles for the Insurer, the Insured and Defense
Counsel: The Eternal Triangle Reformed, 66 TUL. L. REV. 511, 522 (1991); see
also Symposium, Liability Insurance Conflicts and Professional Responsibil-
ity, 4 CONN. INS. L.J. 1 (1997).
96. See Charles Silver, Does Insurance Defense Counsel Represent the
Company or the Insured?, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1483, 1602-14 (1994) (arguing the
dual-client view).
97. The reporter's note to Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers
section 215 states that "[w]hen a dispute between insured and insurer exists
over settlement, the duties of a defense lawyer representing the insured are
controlled, not by the policy, but by the lawyer's professional duties. .. "
RESTATEMENT OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, supra note 12, § 215. See, e.g.,
Rogers v. Robson, Masters, Ryan, Brummund & Belom, 407 N.E.2d 47 (Ill.
1980) (holding that lawyers designated by a medical-malpractice insurer to
defend a doctor had a duty to tell the doctor of the insurer's intent to settle
the claim within policy limits contrary to the doctor's insistence against set-
tlement, even though the policy gave the insurer authority to settle).
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additional undisclosed injury. Although it may be difficult to
fully comprehend Arveson's failure to consult his clients before
deciding not to disclose a potentially life-threatening condition,
we believe this occurred for two related reasons. First, Spauld-
ing took place before the substantial movement away from pa-
ternalism in the lawyer-client relationship that has taken
place since the 1960s.98 Second, insurance defense counsel in
the 1950s tended to view the liability insurer as the real party
in interest in all accident cases that were likely to settle within
the policy limits.99
The lawyer-client relationship, especially in the individ-
ual-client sector of the profession, has traditionally been char-
acterized by a dominant lawyer, possessing expertise unavail-
able to the lay client, who takes a large role in controlling the
flow of information and managing or making decisions. 100 In
this tradition, the client is passive, trusting and obedient--"the
lawyer knows best." Since the consumer movement of the
1960s, however, a more participatory model of lawyering has
grown in prominence and, in modest ways, is now reflected in
professional rules. Although the "informed consent" doctrine
applicable to physicians in many situations has not been car-
ried over wholesale to lawyers, elements of it are now more
firmly established in rules, judicial decisions and ethics opin-
ions.10'
Spaulding also illustrates ways in which the insurance de-
fense practice has changed and continues to change. We are
told that in Minnesota in 1957, in a case which both the parties
and the lawyers believed would be disposed of within policy
limits, defense lawyers had little contact with the individual
defendants except as a source of accident-related information
relevant to the existence or magnitude of legal liability. 02
Even though the accident in Spaulding was a major one (two
98. See DOUGLAS E. ROSENTHAL, LAWYER AND CLIENT: WHO'S IN CHARGE?
1-28 (1974) (contrasting the "traditional model" of the lawyer-client relation-
ship with the emerging "participatory model" in which the lawyer and client
are equal participants in a joint endeavor); see also MODEL RULES, supra note
10, Rule 1.2 cmt. 1 (stating that "in many cases the client-lawyer relationship
partakes of a joint undertaking").
99. Telephone Interview by Lori P. Knowles with Richard L. Pemberton
(Apr. 22, 1998).
100. See ROSENTHAL, supra note 98, at 7-28.
101. See, e.g., Susan Martyn, Informed Consent in the Practice of Law, 48
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 307, 321-33 (1980).
102. Telephone Interview with Richard L. Pemberton, supra note 99.
[Vol. 83:63
PROFESSIONAL SECRECY
persons killed and nine others hospitalized), presumably mem-
bers of a rural farm community resembling Garrison Keillor's
Lake Wobegon would be unlikely to assert injury claims
against each other in excess of the policy limits. Indeed, the
total aggregate settlements arising out of the accident in which
Spaulding and a number of other persons were seriously in-
jured (and two passengers were killed) was $40,000; and all
claims were settled within policy limits. Under these circum-
stances, the liability insurers who retained the defense lawyers
and controlled future business were treated as the sole parties
in interest.103
The potential for conflicts of interest in the insurance de-
fense situation is readily apparent.104 Insurance defense coun-
sel earn their livelihood by getting repeat business from insur-
ers. Policies typically permit the liability insurer to select the
insured's lawyer, control the defense, and make the settlement
decision.105 Insurance law enforces these obligations by re-
quiring the insurer to cooperate or lose the benefits of insur-
ance coverage and defense. Defense counsel, especially in
situations in which the claim falls within the policy limits, are
therefore inclined to view the insurer as the sole party in inter-
est. This arrangement poses the risk that defense counsel may
consult with, and take directions solely from, the insurer-a
danger that ripens into a severe conflict when a coverage ques-
tion or excess liability possibility arises.
Indeed, in the Spaulding case, we are told, the individual
defendants were neither informed of Dr. Hannah's report nor
consulted about whether it should be disclosed to Spaulding.106
It is possible that the disclosure issue was discussed with the
insurers in connection with their agreement to accept various
settlement proposals. It is not clear, however, that the issue
was the subject of pointed and meaningful consultation as dis-
tinct from a routine forwarding of information. The most likely
103. See id.
104. For comprehensive discussion of conflict of interest issues in liability
insurance defense representation, see Symposium, Liability Insurance Con-
flicts and Professional Responsibility, 4 CONN. INS. L.J. 1 (1997), especially
the articles by Nancy J. Moore, Thomas D. Morgan, Stephen L. Pepper, and
Kent D. Syverud.
105. See id.
106. Conversations between Lori P. Knowles and surviving parties and
lawyers.
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conclusion is that the defense lawyers made this decision
largely on their own.
b. counseling the actual client rather than imputing selfish
goals
The hypothesis that the Zimmerman and Ledermann
families were ignorant of David Spaulding's aneurysm helps
explain their otherwise inexplicable silence in not communi-
cating his danger to him. Had John Zimmerman known of the
condition, it seems unlikely, for the reasons stated earlier, that
he would have remained silent under the circumstances: When
the accident occurred he was driving a co-worker, who was
probably also a friend, to the co-worker's home.1 07 Moreover,
the Zimmerman and Ledermann families each lost young
members of their families in the accident. It is improbable that
they would knowingly allow their family tragedies to be visited
upon the Spaulding family, even if preventing this from hap-
pening would likely cost them more money.
Some law students, in discussing Spaulding, assume that
most clients, when consulted, will make a selfish choice. John
Zimmerman, they assert, is likely both to fear increased liabil-
ity or future increases in insurance premiums and to prefer his
own selfish interests over any moral obligation he may have
toward David Spaulding.108 Yet, as we have already stated, we
believe this to be unlikely on the actual facts of Spaulding.
There is no evidence to indicate any personal ill will between
the individual parties in the case, and Zimmerman is just as
likely to have a good character as anyone else.
Furthermore, contrary to what often seems to be popular
opinion, the same is likely to be true of the insurance personnel
who adjust and settle liability insurance claims-especially in
routine cases involving relatively small stakes. As Stephen
Pepper has said: "I wonder why we assume that the middle-
level manager in the defendant's insurance company.., is
likely to be more concerned with company profits (or with his
career advancement or security) than with the possible death
107. Telephone Interview with Leona Zimmerman, supra note 82.
108. See Marvin W. Mindes, Trickster, Hero and Helper: A Report on Law-
yer Image, 1982 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 177 (reporting tendency of lawyers to
believe, erroneously, that their clients have selfish motives).
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of the plaintiff, or why we think that the manager is likely to
have less moral sensitivity than the lawyer."'109
Lawyers have a terrible habit of fitting client objectives
into a simplified moral framework-assuming that clients are
governed only by selfish concerns-and then deciding matters
for them as if the clients were moral ciphers.110 An interesting
study by Marvin Mindes provides empirical support for the
view that clients and lawyers have quite different views con-
cerning what clients want from lawyers. 1' Clients want a
caring and helping counselor and advocate, but lawyers com-
monly believe that clients want a trickster who is focused on
"winning."
In any event, lawyers cannot abdicate moral responsibility
for immoral conduct by assuming that clients, if asked, will in-
sist on a selfish response oblivious to moral obligation. In fact,
most clients will defer to a lawyer's moral, as well as legal, ad-
vice. An effort to persuade the client that the risk to Spaulding
outweighs any monetary loss is therefore likely to be successful
in many cases. For example, a long term perspective may con-
vince a client that a greater respect for the interests of others
is in the client's best interests. Or, the lawyer may draw the
client's attention to risks that the client does not fully appreci-
ate, such as reputational losses if the nondisclosure became
publicly known. In short, the lawyer must undertake a legal
and moral dialogue with a client before even thinking of ac-
tions that are likely to harm the client.
The most important lesson of Spaulding, then, concerns
the lawyer's counseling role: the lawyer must take the client
seriously as a person, communicate with and advise the real
client (not a client stereotype), and engage in a moral dialogue
109. Pepper, supra note 7, at 1606.
110. See William H. Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy, 1978 WIS. L. REV.
30, 53-54. The author states that: "The [lawyer's] strategy [for dealing with
the dilemma of the difficulty of determining client ends without shaping
them] is to impute certain basic ends to the client at the outset and [then] to
work to advance these imputed ends." Thus, the personal injury claimant is
presumed to be interested only in the largest award, and the criminal defen-
dant is presumed to be interested only in being relieved of all responsibility
for his conduct. Imputed ends are invariably extremely selfish ones. See id.
111. Mindes, supra note 108 (setting forth an empirical study finding that
the attitudes of clients and lawyers are quite divergent on the question of cli-
ent needs or wants: the clients want a helpful, communicative and caring law-
yer; lawyers, however, take a much more cynical view of their client's desires,
believing that clients want a trickster).
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in which lawyer and client can learn from each other how to act
decently in an unredeemed world.
D. WHO AMONG US WILL Do THE RIGHT THING?
Once this conversation has occurred and the client contin-
ues to insist upon an immoral course of conduct, what steps are
left to a lawyer? One option that immediately comes to mind,
of course, is for the lawyer to withdraw from the representa-
tion. The Spaulding facts do not present a situation in which
the ethics rules would require withdrawal.1 12 However, with-
drawal is generally permissible so long as it will not have a
material adverse effect on the client. 1 3 Moreover, Model Rule
1.16(b) expands permissive withdrawal to situations in which
the client is pursuing a repugnant or imprudent objective, even
if withdrawal will have a material adverse effect on the cli-
ent.114 If the question arises on the eve of trial or during trial,
however, the lawyer's freedom to withdraw is more limited be-
cause the court is likely to reject the lawyer's request. In any
event, a silent withdrawal does not resolve the tension between
loyalty to client and protecting the interests of others. Silent
withdrawal leaves the client in the lurch, and leaves the per-
son threatened with harm still exposed to risk. Withdrawal is
often more of a "flight" response-an easy escape from a diffi-
cult situation-than a solution to a difficult moral dilemma.
1. Enough blame to go around
At this point the analyst of the Spaulding case (usually a
law student in a legal ethics class) has to face the harsh possi-
bility that a zealous lawyer, who fails to persuade a selfish cli-
112. Model Rule 1.16(a) requires a lawyer to withdraw when representa-
tion "will result in violation of the rules of professional conduct or other law,'
"the lawyer's physical or mental condition materially impairs the lawyer's
ability to represent the client," or "the lawyer is discharged."
113. See id. Rule 1.16(b).
114. Unlike Model Rule 1.6(b), DR 2-110(A)(2) of the Model Code provided
that a lawyer could not withdraw "until he has taken reasonable steps to
avoid foreseeable prejudice to the rights of his client." Model Rule 1.6(b)(3)
permits a lawyer to withdraw when a client "insists on pursuing an objective
that the lawyer considers repugnant or imprudent," while DR 2-110(C)(1)(e) of
the Model Code, in addition to the requirements mentioned above, limited
permissive withdrawal to non-litigation situations in which a client insists
"that the lawyer engage in conduct that is contrary to the judgment and ad-
vice of the lawyer." See RESTATEMENT OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, supra
note 12, § 44(3)(f) & cmt. j (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, March 29, 1996).
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ent concerning what the client should do, may be required to
risk a human life in pursuing a client's case. One common re-
sponse is to deflect blame from the defense lawyers who failed
to disclose to the plaintiffs lawyer or to the examining physi-
cian.
Reliance on the adversary system excuse points the finger
at Roberts, Spaulding's lawyer, who failed to request Dr. Han-
nah's report or, absent a formal discovery request, to ask
pointed questions of the defense lawyers concerning its content
prior to settlement. 15 Theoretically, Roberts would be liable
for malpractice if his lack of due care harmed his client. 16
However, the requisite harmful consequence may not be dis-
covered until after Spaulding dies or suffers a further injury.
The malpractice remedy is also dependent upon Spaulding or
his personal representative proving that the aneurysm was
caused by the 1956 collision. Finding a lawyer willing to sue
another lawyer is a further hurdle, even if Roberts had mal-
practice coverage or personal assets sufficient to pay an
award."17 Yet, even more fundamentally, the case is not ulti-
mately about money, but turns on questions of life and death.
Blaming Spaulding's lawyer does not excuse the inaction of
115. In practice settings in which lawyers tend to trust each other, Dr.
Hannah's report or a summary of its content could probably have been ob-
tained by informal request. In addition, pointed questions at the settlement
conference as to whether its content was the same as that of the plaintiffs ex-
perts presumably would have elicited truthful responses. IfArveson had mis-
represented the content of Dr. Hannah's report during the settlement discus-
sions, the settlement could be set aside on fraud grounds and damages
awarded. The fraud claim lies against both the settling party and the lawyer
who assists the fraud. See, e.g., Slotkin v. Citizens Cas. Co., 614 F.2d 301,
312-15 (2d Cir. 1979) (lawyer liable to non-client for obtaining settlement by
recklessly and falsely representing that client had only $200,000 in insurance
coverage); see also Bonavire v. Wampler, 779 F.2d 1011, 1014-15 (4th Cir.
1985) (liability if lawyer misrepresented client's honesty and experience). Be-
cause of the ability of some lawyers to mislead without making affirmative
misrepresentations, the safest course is examination of the full report after
formal or informal request.
116. The trial court's memorandum in Spaulding suggested this possibil-
ity. 116 N.W.2d at 709. For discussion of legal malpractice generally, see
HAZARD ET AL., supra note 8, at 174-93.
117. In addition, in rural Minnesota in the late 1950s, Spaulding or his
successors in interest would have encountered substantial difficulty in finding
a lawyer who would pursue a medical malpractice case against a local physi-
cian, and even greater difficulty in finding one who would undertake a legal
malpractice case. Today, such representation is much more readily available.
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those who possess information that can prevent the death of
another."i8
Others place the blame on Dr. Hannah, who they believe
should have disclosed the aneurysm to Spaulding or his treat-
ing physicians. Like the defense lawyers, Dr. Hannah was in a
position to take corrective action. We think it clear that Dr.
Hannah had a moral obligation to inform Spaulding of the con-
dition that threatened his life. This is so even though he was
an "examining physician," hired and paid by the defendants to
assist them in litigation, rather than a "treating physician,"
who would have a full doctor-patient relationship with
Spaulding."l9 Moreover, subsequent developments in medical
ethics make it reasonably clear that the moral obligation ex-
isting in 1957 has ripened today into a professional 20 as well
as a legal duty.121 In any event, why should the failure of oth-
118. See RHODE & LUBAN, supra note 8, at 253 (blaming Spaulding's law-
yer "amount[s] to blaming a murder victim's bodyguard for falling asleep on
the job rather than blaming the murderer").
119. See AMA COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, CODE OF
MEDICAL ETHICS § 5.09 (1996-97 ed.) (physician's examination of employee for
employer does not create a doctor-patient relationship when it involves no
treatment, but physician must still disclose important health information to
employee).
120. Rules of medical ethics contain broader exceptions to confidentiality
than those applicable to lawyers. Physicians are required by ethics rules and
other law to disclose patient information to public authorities under a variety
of circumstances (e.g., suspicious deaths, gun shot wounds, and communicable
diseases) or to those threatened by serious disease (e.g., disclosure to sexual
partner of patient infected with AIDS virus). Nothing in the rules of medical
ethics would prohibit Dr. Hannah from informing Spaulding or Spaulding's
treating physicians of his condition. See id.
121. Courts have recognized a common law duty of psychotherapists to
take reasonable steps to prevent harm to a specific third person when a pa-
tient threatens death or substantial injury to that person. See Tarasoff v. Re-
gents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976). Tarasoff is followed in a
number of other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Peck v. Counseling Servs., 499 A.2d
422 (Vt. 1985) (extending the Tarasoff duty in favor of the patient's parents,
whose barn was burned down). For a review of case developments involving
the Tarasoff duty, see D.L. Rosenhan et al., Warning Third Parties: The Rip-
ple Effect of Tarasoff, 24 PAC. L.J. 1165 (1993). For discussion of the liability
of examining physicians, see Malcolm Meyn, Jr., The Liability of Physicians
Who Examine for Third Parties, 19 N. KY. L. REV. 333 (1992). Meyn states
that an examining physician (one who does not have a physician-patient rela-
tionship with the person examined) has a common law duty "to disclose to the
examinee any life threatening or serious medical problem discovered during
the course of the examination." Id. at 338. This duty of care, Meyn states,
does not extend to discovery of unknown conditions. See also Neil J. Squil-
lante, Expanding the Potential Tort Liability of Physicians: A Legal Portrait of
"Nontraditional Patients" and Proposals for Change, 40 UCLA L. REV. 1617
PROFESSIONAL SECRECY
ers to prevent a harm relieve lawyers of moral responsibility
for their own failure to act?
The defense lawyers, Arveson and Rosengren, when their
conduct is viewed in hindsight and on the assumption that
they decided against disclosure without consulting either the
individual defendants or the insurers, behaved monstrously in
violating fundamental legal and moral obligations they owed to
their clients: (1) the duty to inform them of an important mat-
ter so that they could exercise the decisionmaking authority
that the law of lawyering vests in clients; and (2) the moral ob-
ligation to provide their clients with sound advice as to what
they should do under the circumstances. If these observations
are correct, Spaulding is a case of multiple professional fail-
ures on the part of Spaulding's lawyer, Dr. Hannah, and the
defense lawyers.
2. The proper response to professional failure
Professional failure, because it occurs quite frequently and
is both a personal and an institutional problem, deserves more
attention than it gets. Some years ago Charles Bosk wrote a
fine book on professional failure as encountered by surgeons. 22
Bosk recognized that we all make mistakes, some of which may
cause serious harm, and that these instances of departure from
professional standards of due care are enlarged by practice
structures and professional ideologies, such as the built-in con-
flict of interest of insurance defense counsel or the professional
attitude that clients are only interested in winning (so why
consult them about disclosing Spaulding's condition to him?).
Bosk's thesis is suggested by his title: "Forgive and Remem-
ber": an ability to forgive ourselves and our professional col-
leagues for our inevitable imperfections, while striving to cor-
rect through memory the circumstances, conditions and
inattentions that lead to professional failure.
In the Spaulding case, we believe the defense lawyers
were influenced by the authoritarian and paternalistic pattern
of practice that was much more common in the 1950s than it is
today.'23 This professional attitude was combined with the
(1993) (criticizing decisions holding that an examining physician owes no duty
to inform the examined person of an observed health problem).
122. CHARLES L. BOSK, FORGIVE AND REMEMBER: MANAGING MEDICAL
FAILURE (1979) (discussing the way surgeons recognize, manage, control and
sometimes deny professional failure).
123. See, e.g., ROSENTHAL, supra note 98; Mark Spiegel, The New Model
1998]
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then-common view that the insurer was essentially the sole cli-
ent, and with the assumption, discussed above, that insurers
were interested only in saving money.12 4 An ingrained practice
can be thoughtlessly and callously applied to an extreme situa-
tion, such as that in Spaulding, in which human life is at risk.
Therefore, it was convenient and efficient for the defense law-
yers, without consulting either the individual defendants or
(perhaps) the insurers, to decide the disclosure question on
their own.
It is fashionable today to lament the decline of professional
standards and to mourn the passing of a golden age of lawyer-
ing in which lawyers were more civil to each other and more
public-spirited than in today's era of "commercialism."2 5 Yet
the facts of Spaulding suggest that, in a number of important
ways, things have gotten better rather than worse. For one
thing, procedural rules today may often require disclosure of
basic facts concerning liability or damages. At any rate, to-
day's better trained and more competent trial bar would most
likely either ask for Dr. Hannah's report or, more informally,
pin the defense lawyers down on its content. In addition to
current practice, today's professional rules require defense
lawyers retained by a liability insurer to consult with their
"primary client," the insured, even though the insurer controls
the defense and may settle without the insured's consent. Fi-
nally, the lawyer-client relationship today, even in the individ-
ual-client sector of the profession, is more participatory and
less authoritarian than it was forty years ago. Every era has
its problems, and some evils are perennial; but some solace can
be derived from recognizing that institutional and other
changes have improved many aspects of client representation.
Rules of Professional Conduct: Lawyer-Client Decisionmaking and the Role of
Rules in Structuring the Lawyer-Client Dialogue, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J.
1003, 1003.
124. See Silver, supra note 96.
125. See, e.g., MARY ANNE GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAWYERS: How
THE CRISIS IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION IS TRANSFORMING AMERICAN SOCIETY
(1994); ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE
LEGAL PROFESSION (1993); SOL LNOWITZ (WITH MARTIN MAYER), THE
BETRAYED PROFESSION: LAWYERING AT THE END OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
(1994).
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II. REFORMING THE LAW OF LAWYER SECRECY
Even if we have made progress in some respects, it re-
mains true that some clients in any age may be totally self-
centered and morally obtuse. Perhaps in the Spaulding case
itself or another one like it, the moral delinquency flows from
clients who spurn their lawyers' advice and refuse to do the
right thing. When that occurs, lawyers are faced with serious
moral and practical problems because current ethics codes of-
ten prohibit them from preventing a wrong which is about to
occur. Current codes governing lawyer conduct often prohibit a
lawyer from disclosing confidential client information to pre-
vent criminal, fraudulent or other conduct threatening serious
harm to others.
When that situation arises, a good lawyer has only three
options: (1) participate in immoral conduct by doing the client's
bidding; (2) withdraw from the representation if that is possi-
ble (an action that may not prevent the client, perhaps with the
assistance of a new and uninformed lawyer, from harming
third-party interests); or (3) engage in conscientious disobedi-
ence of the profession's rules. Each alternative is problematic
in its own way: the first violates the lawyer's conscience and
implicates the lawyer morally and legally in causing the harm-
ful consequences; the second exposes the lawyer to civil liabil-
ity claims brought by those who are harmed by the client's
wrongful action, especially when the lawyer has facilitated a
fraudulent transaction; and the third results in client recrimi-
nation and creates risks of professional discipline and malprac-
tice litigation.
If the threatened harm is as serious and as likely to occur
as that in Spaulding, we would like to think that most lawyers,
including ourselves, would take the path of conscientious diso-
bedience. But professional rules should not require lawyers in
the everyday practice of law to act heroically. Ordinary human
beings, including lawyers, should not be put in the position of
risking their livelihood or careers by doing the right thing.
Part H of this paper argues that exceptions to the professional
duty of confidentiality should be broad enough to permit the
lawyer to take action necessary to prevent serious and usually
irreparable harm in situations when failure to do so is clearly
condemned by ordinary morality.
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A. THE MORAL TRADITION OF LAWYERING: JUSTIFYING AND
LIMITING LAWYER SECRECY
Two bodies of law confer a large degree of justifiable se-
crecy on information acquired by lawyers in the representation
of clients: the attorney-client privilege and the professional
duty of confidentiality. A third and more recent doctrine-the
work product immunity of procedural law, which protects in-
formation prepared in anticipation of litigation-is important,
but will not be considered in this article.126
1. The attorney-client privilege
The attorney-client privilege of evidence law, the oldest of
the privileges recognized by the common law, prevents the ad-
mission into evidence of a communication between a client and
a lawyer made to obtain legal advice. 27 The holder of the
privilege is the client, but the lawyer has an ethical obligation
to assert the privilege on behalf of the client when a request by
a tribunal possessing the power to compel testimony seeks in-
formation that may be privileged.128 The privilege is justified
on both utilitarian and humanistic grounds.
The utilitarian justification of the attorney-client privilege
starts with the assumption that individuals need informed le-
gal advice to defend or secure their legal rights; informed legal
advice not only serves the client's private interests, but also
advances the public interests of conformity to law and sound
administration of justice. 129 By encouraging the client to com-
126. For discussion of the work product immunity, see RESTATEMENT OF
LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, supra note 12, sections 136 to 138 (Proposed Final
Draft No. 1, March 29, 1997). The reporter's notes to these sections collect
relevant judicial and scholarly authorities.
127. See id. §§ 118-35 (discussing the scope of the attorney-client privilege,
its application to organizational and multiple clients, duration and waiver,
exceptions, and invoking the privilege). See generally CHRISTOPHER B.
MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRPATRICK, MODERN EVIDENCE: DOCTRINE AND
PRACTICE, §§ 5.9-5.30, at 459-585 (1995).
128. For the relationship of the attorney-client privilege to constitutional
rights, especially the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination
and the Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel, see RE-
STATEMENT OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, supra note 12, section 118, re-
porter's note to comment c and materials cited.
129. The most frequently cited decision stating the utilitarian rationale is
Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) (justifying the attorney-
client privilege because it permits a lawyer to provide sound advice and advo-
cacy with effects that are in the public interest: channeling client conduct
along lawful paths and enhancing the reliability of adversary adjudication).
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municate all relevant information-even facts that are inti-
mate, unpleasant or embarrassing-the privilege puts lawyers
in a position to offer the client sound legal advice in counseling
and effective advocacy in litigation. Clients, it is assumed, will
choose among lawful alternative courses of action advised by
the lawyer. Conduct will be channeled along law-abiding lines
and the goals of the adversary system will be advanced by
sound representation of all parties.
The humanistic or rights-oriented justification stresses the
role of the privilege in advancing client autonomy, dignity and
privacy. 130 It also reflects the relationship between the attor-
ney-client privilege and two provisions of the Bill of Rights:
The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and
the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel in
criminal cases. 131 An accused should not be convicted on the
basis of a forced disclosure of the client's privileged communi-
cations to his lawyer. Forcing the accused's lawyer to testify
concerning those communications would be an indirect way of
requiring the accused to testify against himself, and would
deny him effective assistance of counsel.
The functions and purposes of the attorney-client privilege
also determine its limits. The privilege is intended to further
lawful advice and conduct. 132 When the client, concealing his
illegal intent and objective, consults a lawyer to commit or con-
tinue a crime or fraud, the privilege evaporates. 133 The crime-
fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege, 134 recognized in
every state, is supported by two fundamental propositions of
the profession's historic traditions and of state ethics codes.
First, in all jurisdictions a lawyer is prohibited from counseling
130. See MONROE H. FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHICS 13-17,
87-108 (1990); LUBAN, supra note 7, at 192-97; MUELLER & KIRPATRICK, supra
note 127, at 357-58.
131 See, e.g., HAZARD ETAL., supra note 8, at 221-22, 243-45.
132. In addition to the crime-fraud materials discussed in note 134, infra,
the rationale for the privilege expressed in the Upjohn case also emphasizes
the role of the privilege in assuring the public values of lawful advice and
sound administration ofjustice. 449 U.S. at 389.
133. See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 127, at 419-26.
134. For discussion of the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client
privilege, see RESTATEMENT OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, supra note 12, sec-
tion 132. The classic expression of the underlying principle is that of Justice
Cardozo in Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 15 (1933): "The privilege takes
flight if the relation is abused. A client who consults an attorney for advice
that will serve him in the commission of a fraud will have no help from the
law."
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or assisting a client in unlawful conduct.135 Second, in the vast
majority of jurisdictions a lawyer is permitted to disclose confi-
dential information to prevent the client from committing or
continuing a crime or fraud.136
2. The professional duty of confidentiality
The professional duty of confidentiality is broader in scope
and application than the attorney-client privilege. 137 The duty
applies in all settings and at all times, not only when a tribu-
nal seeks to compel testimony. A lawyer, as an agent of the cli-
ent, may not disclose or use information gained in the agency
relationship to the disadvantage of the client. 38 Agency law
combines this broad prohibition with a general exception that
permits disclosure when the superior interest of another ex-
ists.1 39 Because the lawyer-client relationship deals with client
interests of great sensitivity and importance-such as reputa-
tion, property and freedom-the profession has justifiably con-
cluded that a greater degree of confidentiality is required here
than in other agency relationships. But "the central moral tra-
dition of lawyering"140 has always included permission for the
lawyer to disclose confidential information in order to prevent
135. See Model Rule 1.2(d) and its predecessor in the Model Code, DR 7-
102(A)(7). One or the other of these provisions is included in the professional
codes of every state except California, which has its own comparable provi-
sion. See CALIF. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3-210 (1996) (lawyer
may not advise the violation of law).
136. In 1997, according to the ALAS Memorandum, supra note 11, 31 ju-
risdictions either permitted or required a lawyer to disclose a client's inten-
tion to commit any future crime, and at least 40 jurisdictions permitted or re-
quired a lawyer to disclose the client's intention to commit a criminal fraud
likely to result in injury to the financial interest or property of another per-
son.
137. See RESTATEMENT OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, supra note 12, §§
111-17A (restating the professional duty of confidentiality); see also HAZARD
ET AL., supra note 8, at 220-22, 280-286.
138. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 395, 388 cmt. a (1958)
(prohibiting self-dealing in principal's information); see also MODEL RULES,
supra note 10, Rule 1.8(b) (prohibiting a lawyer from using "information re-
lating to representation of a client to the disadvantage of the client unless the
client consents after consultation" or unless disclosure is permitted or re-
quired by other rules).
139. Agency law requires an agent "not to use or to communicate informa-
tion confidentially given him by the principal or acquired by him during the
course of or on account of his agency," RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §
395 (1958). This is subject to a power of the agent to reveal information when
necessary to protect the superior interest of a third person. See id. & cmt. f.
140. Lawry, supra note 78.
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a client crime or fraud. In addition, until recently the domi-
nant tradition has required the lawyer to disclose confidential
client information to rectify a client fraud on a third person or
a tribunal when the lawyer's services were used to perpetrate
the fraud.
Initially promulgated in 1908 and subsequently amended,
the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics provided ethical guide-
lines for lawyers until replaced by the ABA Model Code of Pro-
fessional Responsibility in 1970.141 The Canons included sev-
eral prominent exceptions to the requirement of lawyer
secrecy. Canon 37, after stating the default rule of confidenti-
ality, permitted disclosure to prevent "[t]he announced inten-
tion of a client to commit a crime." Canon 29 required disclo-
sure by a trial lawyer of peijury committed in a case handled
by the lawyer. Canon 41 required a lawyer, when the client re-
fused to act, "to rectify.., some [client] fraud or deception...
unjustly imposed on the court or a party" by "promptly in-
forming the injured person or his counsel, so that they may
take appropriate steps."
These exceptions to confidentiality were continued in the
1969 Model Code of Professional Responsibility. DR 4-101(C)(3)
permitted a lawyer to reveal "the intention of his client to
commit a crime and the information necessary to prevent the
crime." DR 7-102(B)(1) provided:
A lawyer who receives information clearly establishing that: (1) His
client has, in the course of the representation, perpetrated a fraud
upon a person or tribunal shall promptly call upon his client to rectify
the same, and if his client refuses or is unable to do so, he shall re-
veal the fraud to the affected person or tribunal.
The ABA partially abandoned these positions in a 1974
amendment to DR 7-102(B)(1) that essentially abrogated the
disclosure requirement of that rule; the amendment, however,
was adopted in only 14 states.142 A broader retreat occurred in
1983 when the ABA, in recommending adoption of the Model
141. See MORGAN & ROTUNDA STANDARDS, supra note 50 (containing the
texts of the Canons and the Model Code).
142. See HAZARD ET AL., supra note 8, at 297. The 1974 amendment and
an ethics opinion interpreting it are discussed at pages 294-300. ABA Comm.
on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 341 (1975), interpreting
the 1974 "except" clause as preventing disclosure of non-privileged as well as
privileged information, suggested that the amendment was necessary to clar-
ify confusion arising from the inconsistency of DR 7-102(B)(1) with confidenti-
ality provisions and prior ethics opinions. Yet the text of both the Canons and
the Model Code explicitly required disclosure.
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Rules of Professional Conduct, eliminated the exceptions to
confidentiality that had paralleled the crime-fraud exception to
the attorney-client privilege.143 Disclosure was permitted to
protect a lawyer's economic and reputational interests in de-
fending against charges by others. However, protection of
third-party interests through disclosure of confidential infor-
mation was limited to two situations: fraud on a tribunal, dealt
with by Model Rule 3.3(a)(4), and a limited opportunity under
Model Rule 1.6(b) to disclose confidential client information "to
prevent the client from committing a criminal act that the law-
yer believes is likely to result in imminent death or substantial
bodily harm."
On the central question of disclosure to prevent a client's
intention to commit a criminal fraud likely to result in injury
to the financial interest or property of another, state high
courts have emphatically rejected the ABA position. At least
forty of the fifty-one U.S. jurisdictions require or permit the
lawyer to disclose confidential client information in this situa-
tion.144
B. REFORMING THE PROFESSIONAL DUTY OF CONFIDENTIALITY
1. Disclosure to prevent or rectify client fraud
The very policies and purposes that justify the professional
duty of confidentiality in the first place argue strongly for a
permissive exception to that duty corresponding to the client-
fraud exception of the attorney-client privilege. If a lawyer is
required to testify to a client communication, otherwise privi-
leged, when the client has sought the lawyer's advice and
143. For discussion of the ABA's 1983 action, see Schneyer, supra note 10,
at 718-23. Schneyer's illuminating study of the legislative history of the adop-
tion of the Model Rules provides information confirming a shift in attitudes
toward confidentiality during the 1970s, especially on the part of the corpo-
rate defense bar. The elite organization of this group, the American College of
Trial Lawyers (ACTL), which led the assault on the client fraud exception to
confidentiality recommended by the Kutak Commission, had its own Code of
Trial Conduct (1972) that provided, in language following the traditional ex-
ceptions, "that a lawyer is not 'bound to respect' confidences concerning his
client's intention to commit any crime;" indeed, the ACTL Code stated that
the lawyer "should [disclose] if injury to person or property is likely to ensue."
Id. at 720. Schneyer suggests that ACTL's opposition to the Kutak version of
Model Rule 1.6(b), which essentially restated its own ethics code, reflected
changes in the profession and a fear that the new rule, unlike its own code,
might have "real legal bite." Id.
144. See ALAS Memorandum, supra note 11.
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services to perpetrate or continue a fraud, a concomitant dis-
cretion to disclose without testimonial compulsion should be
recognized under the professional duty of confidentiality. Nei-
ther the legal profession nor society as a whole should tolerate
a regime in which lawyers may be used by clients as a means of
carrying out a crime or fraud.
Permissive disclosure in this context reinforces the law-
yer's duty to provide only lawful assistance and advice to cli-
ents, giving the lawyer a last-resort weapon and increased lev-
erage in dealing with a client embarked on a fraudulent course
of conduct. 45 Moreover, a lawyer's failure to take reasonable
steps to prevent or rectify client fraud is likely to lead to civil
liability of the lawyer. If insolvency and litigation occur in the
aftermath of the fraud, the client's confidentiality will inevita-
bly disappear. 146
While it is possible to reach the same result by expanding
the self-defense exception to include a proactive rather than
reactive disclosure, 47 or to interpret the prohibition on assist-
ing client criminal or fraudulent conduct as creating an im-
plied exception to confidentiality, guidance to lawyers is best
145. See Hazard, supra note 54, at 292 (stating that "the law cannot li-
cense some of its subjects, least of all 'lawyers,' to assist in the commission or
concealment of transactions that it defines as serious legal wrongs, such as
fraud."); see also HAZARD ET AL., supra note 8 (discussing the tortured history
of the ABA's handling of client fraud).
146. A successor in interest of the client, such as a bankruptcy trustee, is
likely to waive any privileges in an effort to recover assets for the insolvent
entity. See, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S.
343 (1985) (holding that successor in control of an entity client can waive the
entity's attorney-client privilege over the objections of the officers who con-
sulted with the entity's lawyer). If waiver does not occur, the crime-fraud ex-
ception of the attorney-client privilege may be successfully invoked by a
showing that the client consulted a lawyer to obtain advice concerning the
commission of a crime or fraud. See, e.g., United States v. Hodge & Zweig,
548 F.2d 1347 (9th Cir. 1977). Finally, if the lawyer is charged by defrauded
persons, the lawyer is likely to reveal information relying on the self-defense
exception. See, e.g., Meyerhofer v. Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 497 F.2d
1190 (2d Cir. 1974).
147. The ABA Committee on Ethics and Public Responsibility, unsuccess-
ful in 1991 in obtaining an amendment broadening the exceptions to confiden-
tiality of Model Rule 1.6(b), has interpreted the rule to permit limited disclo-
sure by a lawyer who learns that his client is using his services to perpetrate
a fraud on a third person. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Re-
sponsibility, Formal Op. 92-366 (1992) (relying on provisions of the rules pro-
hibiting unlawful assistance and requiring withdrawal, along with the "noisy
withdrawal" language of comment [15] of Rule 1.6, to prevent prospective cli-
ent fraud).
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provided by a forthright exception to the professional rule
dealing with confidentiality. Similarly, the "noisy withdrawal"
possibility buried in a comment to Model Rule 1.6 is insuffi-
cient because it is inconsistent with the text of the rule itself,
which forbids disclosure. Withdrawal will also be ineffective in
situations in which the victim of the fraud fails to understand
the hidden meaning of the signal, and it generally constitutes
a fertile source of confusion. Lawyers deserve more explicit
guidance from rule-makers. 148
Fortunately, the American Law Institute has now reaf-
firmed the central moral tradition which holds that a lawyer is
permitted to disclose confidential client information to prevent,
mitigate or rectify a client criminal or fraudulent act that has
resulted, or will result, in substantial financial loss to a per-
son.149 Moreover, the ABA Commission on Evaluation of the
Rules of Professional Conduct, referred to as 'Ethics 2000," is
undertaking a review of the Model Rules in light of develop-
ments since 1983.150 The time is now ripe for the ABA to align
its position on exceptions to confidentiality with those in effect
in most American states and which are more consistent with
the profession's historic traditions.
2. Disclosure to prevent death or substantial bodily harm
Once a fraud exception to the professional duty of confi-
dentiality is recognized as a reinforcement to the policies and
purposes that justify lawyer secrecy, the remaining task is to
determine whether there are other third-party interests that
justify a sacrifice of confidentiality. What other interests of
third persons should fall into this category? Four types of
situations provide a vehicle for considering this question:
148. Commentators and ABA insiders have criticized the ABA's position as
incoherent, confusing, and unworkable. See HAZARD ET AL., supra note 8, at
297-300; Ronald D. Rotunda, The Notice of Withdrawal and the New Model
Rules of Professional Conduct: Blowing the Whistle and Waving the Red Flag,
63 OR. L. REV. 455 (1984); 7 ABA/BNA LAW. MANUAL PROF. CONDUCT 256,
258 (Aug. 28, 1991) (confidentiality provisions of Model Rules were
"unworkable" and unfairly exposed lawyers to potential civil liability and
criminal prosecution).
149. See RESTATEMENT OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, supra note 12, §
117B ("Using or Disclosing Information to Prevent, Rectify or Mitigate Sub-
stantial Financial Loss") (Proposed Final Draft No. 2, 1998).
150. The Commission is chaired by E. Norman Veasey, Chief Justice,
Delaware Supreme Court and has 12 other members. Its report and recom-
mendation are expected by the ABA annual meeting in August 2000.
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* The facts of the Spaulding case, on the assumption that
the individual defendants and their insurers refused to consent
to disclosure of the aneurysm.
* A death row scenario:15 1 A client accused of an unrelated
charge informs his lawyer, in plausible detail, that he was re-
sponsible for a murder for which an innocent, uninvolved per-
son is awaiting execution on death row.
* The threatened collapse of a building:1 52 The client, an
owner of a large commercial office building located on an
earthquake fault line in a major city, receives a detailed report
of an architectural engineer to the effect that the building
structure is inadequate to withstand even a modest earth-
quake. An event of this character in the location involved oc-
curs approximately every six years. When it occurs, it is ex-
tremely likely that the building will collapse with substantial
loss of life. The client asks his lawyer for advice about his op-
tions. The lawyer, after advising that no current law requires
the owner to report the danger to public authorities, recom-
mends that the client take prompt steps to inform tenants and
reconstruct the building. The client, concluding that the costs
of rebuilding are too great, decides to do nothing and directs
the lawyer to remain silent.
* The client's violent spouse: The lawyer is defending a cli-
ent whose business is at risk in commercial litigation. The cli-
ent tells the lawyer that her husband, enraged at the tactics of
the opposing party, plans to kill the opposing party's lawyer.
The client is unwilling to consent to disclosure to the potential
victim or the police, even though she disagrees with her hus-
band and has tried to calm him down.
Current ethics codes generally do not permit disclosure in
any of these four scenarios, in which human life is at risk.153
151. A valuable recent symposium discusses the death row scenario. See
Symposium, Executing the Wrong Person: The Professionals' Ethical Dilem-
mas, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1543 (1996) (see especially the articles by W. Wil-
liam Hodes, Mary C. Daly, Monroe H. Freedman, Robert P. Lawry, and Kath-
ryn W. Tate).
152. This scenario is drawn from a California ethics opinion concluding
that the lawyer is not permitted to disclose under these circumstances. Cal.
State Bar Standing Comm. on Professional Responsibility and Conduct, For-
mal Op. 1981-58; see also Roger C. Cramton, Proposed Legislation Concerning
a Lawyer's Duty of Confidentiality, 22 PEPP. L. REV. 1467, 1468 (1995); Fred
Zacharias, Privilege and Confidentiality in California, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
367 (1995).
153. A few exceptions to this statement may be found. See, for example,
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Any change in the ethical rules governing disclosure would
need to recognize some basic principles. The harmful conse-
quence-severe risk to human life-is important enough to jus-
tify an exception to the professional duty of confidentiality if
the surrounding circumstances justify disclosure. Disclosure,
however, should not occur unless certain predicate conditions
have been established: 154 (1) the facts known to the lawyer, af-
ter adequate inquiry and investigation, must give rise to a rea-
sonable belief that disclosure is necessary to prevent someone's
death or serious bodily injury; (2) the lawyer should consult the
client about the intent to disclose unless it is not feasible under
the circumstances (e.g., when the client's plausible threat to
kill himself or a third person may be triggered rather than
avoided by consultation); (3) no other available action is rea-
sonably likely to prevent the threatened harm; and (4) the dis-
closure is limited to what is necessary to prevent the threat-
ened consequence. Although these qualifications will not be
repeated as we discuss the situations in which disclosure
should be permitted, the reader should assume they have been
satisfied in each instance.
The confidentiality provisions of existing ethics codes im-
pose a number of limiting conditions that make them inappli-
cable to situations of the type mentioned. In particular, exist-
ing rules generally limit disclosure to situations in which an
act of the client is involved. The requirement of a client act ex-
cludes situations in which the threatened act is that of a third
person, such as a spouse or associate of the client, and does not
cover harm resulting from a natural event of which the client
has special knowledge, as in the building-collapse scenario.
The requirement may also exclude situations in which there is
no affirmative act more generally, but only an omission or fail-
ure to act.155 Moreover, under most ethics codes, the client's act
the Massachusetts version of Rule 1.6(b), which permits disclosure "to prevent
the wrongful execution or incarceration of another." MASS. RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(1) (1998).
154. These conditions resemble those stated in the RESTATEMENT OF LAW
GOVERNING LAWYERS, supra note 12, at 117A(2):
Before using or disclosing information pursuant to this Section, the
lawyer must, if feasible, make a good faith effort to persuade the cli-
ent either not to act or, if the client or another person has already
acted, to warn the victim or take other action to prevent the harm
and, if relevant, to advise the client of the lawyer's ability to use or
disclose pursuant to this Section and the consequences thereof.
155. Generally, a failure to act would be within existing exceptions to con-
fidentiality only when other law makes such failure a crime or fraud (e.g., a
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must be criminal in character in order to trigger an exception
to the duty of confidentiality. 156
In the scenario based on Spaulding, the client's refusal to
consent to disclosure fails to meet these requirements. Even if
the failure to disclose qualifies as a "client act," it does not con-
stitute a prospective or ongoing crime or fraud. Yet the moral
considerations that justify disclosure have great force in this
situation. Moreover, the rarity of situations of this sort poses
little risk to the overall preservation of confidentiality.
Similarly, the client's refusal to permit disclosure to save
the life of an innocent person from execution does not involve a
prospective client crime. Although the moral dilemma of con-
flicting obligations to client and third person is a difficult one,
ethics rules should provide discretion to disclose when the
harm to an innocent person outweighs the potential harm to
the client.
In the building-collapse scenario, disclosure would be pro-
hibited under current rules because there is no client criminal
act that threatens deadly harm. Indeed, there is no client act
at all, only the possession by the client of special knowle'dge
that a natural event that will cause death is foreseeable and
probable. The requirement in Model Rule 1.6(b)(1) that the
threat be "imminent" is also not satisfied. Protection of inno-
cent life, however, should again justify disclosure.
Finally, in the scenario where the client's spouse plans a
criminal act threatening life, existing exceptions do not apply
because the client is not the actor. Yet the situation is morally
identical to those in which the client is the actor, and in which
current ethics rules permit disclosure.
The rules governing exceptions to confidentiality should
thus be broadened to permit disclosure in all of these situa-
tions. Two basic premises underlie this recommendation.
First, the preservation of human life clearly has as high a pri-
ority in the hierarchy of values as any other threatened conse-
quence. Existing lawyer codes recognize the high priority of
human life, but their application is unduly limited because of
the broad preconditions just discussed. Second, a profession
that justifiably asks for and receives permission to disclose con-
fidential client information when its own economic interests
statute making it a crime to fail to report child abuse).
156. See ALAS Memorandum, supra note 11.
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are at stake (e.g., to collect a fee from a client)157 cannot plausi-
bly take the position that the threatened death or serious in-
jury of another does not justify an occasional sacrifice of confi-
dentiality.
C. UNDERLYING POLICY ISSUES
The central issues in drafting exceptions to confidentiality
involve, first, defining the interests that justify a possible sacri-
fice of the client's interest in secrecy; 158 second, determining
whether the opportunity to disclose should be permissive or
mandatory; third, determining whether limiting language con-
cerning the actor, the victim, or the harm should be included;
and fourth, deciding, in connection with client fraud situations,
whether disclosure should be limited to situations in which the
lawyer's services are or have been involved.
Thus far we have argued that prevention of fraud on a
third person, as well as fraud on a tribunal, is an interest that
overrides the confidentiality interests of the client. 59 Most of
these situations will be ones in which the client has abused the
relationship, attempting to use the lawyer's services for
fraudulent purposes. A lawyer should be free to prevent or rec-
tify the financial injury to third persons that the client plans or
has accomplished. In these situations generally, the informa-
tion involved will not be protected by the attorney-client privi-
lege. These will also be situations in which the lawyer's silence
in the face of client fraud exposes the lawyer to a serious risk of
civil liability to the defrauded persons.
We have also argued that the interests in preserving hu-
man life and bodily integrity justify sacrifice of a client's infor-
157. Model Rule 1.6(b)(2) and DR 4-104(C)(4) of the Model Code permit a
lawyer to disclose client information to defend against an accusation of wrong-
ful conduct or to collect a fee. In California, which has no professional rule
dealing with confidentiality, judicial decisions have relied on the self-defense
exception to the statutory attorney-client privilege as supporting lawyer dis-
closure for self-defense and fee collection. See Roger C. Cramton, Sure
Enough? State Bar's Proposed Rule Only Perpetuates California's Confidenti-
ality Confusion, L.A. DAILY J., Apr. 2, 1997, at 6 [hereinafter Cramton, Sure
Enough?]; Roger C. Cramton, Trade Secrets: Exceptions to the Duty of Confi-
dentiality, L.A. DAILY J., July 14, 1998, at 17 [hereinafter Cramton, Trade Se-
crets].
158. For discussion of the competing policies governing exceptions to law-
yer confidentiality, see SISSELA BOK, SECRETS passim (1982); LUBAN, supra
note 7, at 177-223; Deborah L. Rhode, Ethical Perspectives on Legal Practice,
37 STAN. L. REV. 589, 612-17 (1985).
159. See supra text accompanying notes 137-150.
[Vol. 83:63
PROFESSIONAL SECRECY
mation if disclosure will prevent these serious harms. 160 Simi-
larly, we conclude that a person's interest in averting wrongful
execution or incarceration justifies disclosure, although we rec-
ognize that client betrayal is likely to be more troublesome in
situations in which the disclosure may result in the client be-
ing punished for the crime for which another person has been
wrongfully convicted. The easiest case is one in which the cli-
ent confesses that his false testimony has led to the wrongful
conviction, since the ethics rules of the vast majority of states
mandate disclosure when the lawyer has offered false testi-
mony. 61 But we would follow the example of Massachusetts
and permit disclosure to prevent wrongful incarceration more
broadly.1 62
The second issue, whether the exception to confidentiality
should be mandatory or discretionary, is discussed below; and
the third issue, whether disclosure should be limited to situa-
tions involving a client act that is criminal or fraudulent in
character, has been considered in the prior section. Concern-
ing the fourth issue, whether disclosure in client fraud situa-
tions should be limited to situations in which the client has
used the lawyer's services in carrying out the fraud, we con-
clude that this limitation should be included when after-the-
fact rectification is involved. In these situations the fraud has
already occurred and disclosure of it will inevitably entail
grievous harm to the client. However, when the lawyer is in a
position to prevent a client fraud from occurring, which some-
times may be accomplished with limited harm to the client, a
broader permission to disclose is appropriate. The additional
leverage provided by the lawyer's opportunity to disclose will
usually lead a client to abandon the fraudulent course of ac-
tion.
We now turn to an examination of the major policy argu-
ments for and against broadening exceptions to the lawyer's
professional duty of confidentiality.
160. See supra text accompanying notes 151-157.
161. See MODEL RULES, supra note 10, Rule 3.3(a)(3). The ALAS memo-
randum, supra note 11, states that 38 states require disclosure in this situa-
tion.
162. MASS. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1998).
1998]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
1. Do limited exceptions to confidentiality threaten legitimate
client or public interests?
The major argument against broadening exceptions to con-
fidentiality is that clients will be deterred from confiding in-
formation to their lawyers. 163 The lack of candor on the part of
clients, it is said, will make it difficult for a lawyer to give in-
formed advice. The "sound advice" and "sound administration
of justice" thought to result from this highly confidential rela-
tionship will no longer be achievable. Moreover, the ability of
the lawyer to disclose client information may diminish client
trust by adversely affecting both the quality of the relationship
and the single-mindedness with which the lawyer pursues the
client's interests. If and when the lawyer informs the client
that disclosure is desirable or contemplated, a serious conflict
arises between the lawyer and the client. The client feels be-
trayed and the relationship ends in bitterness.
The response to these arguments is several-fold. First, the
principal exceptions to both the professional duty and the at-
torney-client privilege are longstanding, and their existence
has not had the consequences that are feared. The self-defense
and client-fraud provisions-historic exceptions that have lim-
ited lawyer secrecy from the very beginning-involve situa-
tions that arise frequently. Yet there is no evidence that those
broad exceptions have had undesirable effects on the candor
with which clients communicate to lawyers. A modest broad-
ening of the exceptions in situations that arise relatively rarely
is therefore unlikely to have any discernible effect.
A great deal of romanticism often surrounds discussions of
"trust" and "candor" in the lawyer-client relationship. How-
ever, studies indicate that mistrust and suspicion are fre-
quently encountered in the relationship. 16 Factors that re-
163. See, e.g., FREEDMAN, supra note 130, at 87-108. Freedman's argu-
ment for nearly absolute confidentiality relies heavily on the special constitu-
tional protections afforded criminal defendants. See id. at 15-26. The alter-
native ethics code drafted by Professor Freedman contained no exceptions to
confidentiality other than one to protect innocent human life. See AMERICAN
LAWYER'S CODE OF CONDUCT, Rule 1.4; Monroe H. Freedman, Lawyer-Client
Confidences Under the A.B.A. Model Rules: Ethical Rules Without Ethical
Reason, CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 3, Summer/Fall 1984, at 3.
164. See, e.g., Robert A. Burt, Conflict and Trust Between Attorney and
Client, 69 GEO. L.J. 1015 (1981) (arguing that trust in the relationship would
actually be enhanced by expanding exceptions to confidentiality); Austin
Sarat, Lawyers and Clients: Putting Professional Service on the Agenda of Le-
gal Education, 41 J. LEGAL EDUC. 43 (1991) (summarizing a study of lawyer-
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strict client willingness to confide already operate in various
practice contexts in powerful ways. Lawyers frequently state
that clients are hesitant to reveal embarrassing or sensitive
facts, which need to be dynamited out of them. In the criminal
defense field, for example, both lawyer and client may be reluc-
tant to discuss candidly facts relating directly to guilt, since
doing so may limit the options available to defense counsel.
Second, arguments that candor will be discouraged by
modest rule changes ignore the fact that both lawyers and cli-
ents appear to be relatively uninformed concerning both the
details of exceptions to either the attorney-client privilege or
the professional duty of confidentiality and the relationship of
the two doctrines to one another.165 The available empirical
evidence, albeit very limited, suggests that most lawyers and
clients already expect that confidentiality will be breached
when important interests of third persons or courts would be
impaired.166 Nor is there any indication that clients are more
candid with their lawyers in jurisdictions that have fewer ex-
ceptions to confidentiality than they are in jurisdictions with
broader exceptions. It must be conceded that there is little
solid empirical evidence to support firm conclusions in either
direction. Our position is that, when severe harm is threat-
ened, and that harm could be prevented by disclosure, the re-
ality of that more certain harm should clearly trump dubious
assumptions about effects on client candor.
On the other hand, many clients who are likely to be well-
informed about the details of exceptions to the attorney-client
privilege, the work product immunity and the professional
duty of confidentiality-situations in which the chilling effect
client relationship in matrimonial representation).
165. See Note, Functional Overlap Between Lawyers and Other Profession-
als: Its Implications for the Privileged Communication Doctrine, 71 YALE L.J.
1226, 1232 (1962) (reporting empirical findings that lawyers are more likely
than non-lawyers to believe that the privilege encourages client disclosures
and that most non-lawyers are unaware of the privilege or erroneously as-
sume that it extends to communications with a large number of other profes-
sionals as well).
166. See Fred C. Zacharias, Rethinking Confidentiality, 74 IowA L. REv.
351, 379-96 (1989). This survey of New York lawyers' and clients' responses to
various hypothetical situations found that neither lawyers nor clients were
familiar with the details of the attorney-client privilege or the professional
duty of confidentiality. Both lawyers and clients believed that disclosure was
permissible in a number of situations, like that in Spaulding, in which ethics
rules prohibit disclosure; and only a small percentage of clients felt that al-
lowing such disclosure would make them less likely to use a lawyer's services.
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on candor is most likely-are less deserving of the protection of
secrecy. This group of informed clients is largely confined to
sophisticated repeat-players, usually large corporations who
want to use lawyer secrecy to reduce their costs of complying
with regulatory requirements.167 These clients already have
many advantages in litigation over those with less resources,
experience and staying power.1 68 The policy issues concerning
exceptions to confidentiality should be designed with the inter-
ests of the general public in mind, and not those of narrower
groups that have a special interest in a broad sphere of secrecy.
The social value of secrecy versus disclosure is less when
one is dealing, not with individual citizens encountering law
for the first time, but with repeat-player, profit-making organi-
zations that use secrecy to conceal, or to delay compliance with
regulatory requirements.169 The professional duty of confiden-
tiality should be drafted and interpreted to serve the public in-
terest in the provision of lawful advice, the channeling of client
conduct along lawful paths, and the sound and truthful ad-
167. This was the situation in the Upjohn case itself. Upjohn Co. v. United
States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981). A large multinational corporation, having
learned of law violations by its agents, sought to conceal this information from
federal regulatory agencies, perhaps planning to reveal some of it selectively if
that proved to be in the company's interest. If the information had been con-
tained in an auditor's report, it would not have been protected. See United
States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805 (1984). The Court's confidence in
Upjohn that the government could obtain the underlying information from
relevant witnesses was a dubious one: Upjohn had instructed its employees
not to discuss the matters involved with anyone, and informal contacts with
them by government lawyers presumably would be attacked as a violation of
the anti-contact rule, which prohibits a lawyer from communicating with a
person known to be represented by counsel. See MODEL RULES, supra note
10, Rule 4.2. Moreover, the employees involved were scattered around the
globe and it is not clear that their testimony could be obtained by compulsory
process without extraordinary effort or, in the case of foreign nationals, that it
would be available at all.
168. See, e.g., Marc Galanter, Why the Haves Come Out Ahead, 9 L. &
SOCkY REV. 95 (1974).
169. Daniel Fischel argues that "[cionfidentiality rules-the ethical duty of
confidentiality, the attorney-client privilege, and the work-product doctrine-
benefit lawyers but are of dubious value to clients and society as a whole. Ab-
sent some more compelling justification for their existence than has been ad-
vanced to date, these doctrines should be abolished." Daniel R. Fischel, Law-
yers and Confidentiality, 65 U. CFH. L. REV. 1, 33 (1998). We reject this
extreme proposal. Nevertheless, Fischel's subordinate argument that confi-
dentiality rules in the corporate context "either have no effect [on law obser-
vance] or decrease the level of legal compliance," id. at 28-32, has considerable
force and supports our conclusion that broadened exceptions would be in the
public interest.
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ministration of justice. Its purpose is not to permit clients to
"win" without regard to truthful outcomes. Nor is client confi-
dentiality designed to serve the economic interest of the legal
profession, which can offer clients a degree of secrecy that no
other profession can provide.1 70
Third, there is no evidence that exceptions to confidential-
ity have led or will lead to frequent whistle-blowing on the part
of lawyers.17' American lawyers are imbued with a profes-
sional ideology that gives dominant place to loyalty to client,
treats confidentiality as a sacred trust, and abhors lawyer con-
duct that constitutes a betrayal of client.72 Lawyers know that
harming a client to protect the superior interest of a third
party will lead to the termination of the lawyer-client relation-
ship, probable non-payment of fees, client bitterness and re-
crimination, and possible loss of repute with other lawyers and
clients. Experience shows that lawyers are extraordinarily
reluctant to risk these consequences. The exceptions to confi-
dentiality should not be drafted so narrowly that this natural
risk averseness is reinforced, with the result that loyalty to cli-
ent-even a client who is abusing the lawyer's services to cause
serious harm to third persons-always prevails over the supe-
rior interests of others.
170. Bar groups also worry that expanding exceptions to confidentiality
will expose lawyers to increased liability to clients and non-clients. However,
in the most frequent situation involved-prevention or rectification of client
fraud-liability is already a worrisome reality. Lawyer liability to non-clients
for failure to prevent or rectify client fraud is expanding without seeming re-
gard to whether the ethics code in a jurisdiction prohibits, permits or man-
dates lawyer disclosure. Even more striking, there is no case holding a lawyer
liable to a third person for failing to prevent a death or serious physical harm
even though ethics codes in nearly all states permit disclosure and a substan-
tial number require it. In short, the rules of professional conduct and civil li-
ability appear to be developing along separate tracks. See infra note 178 and
accompanying text.
171. Despite the prevalence of whistleblower statutes applying to state and
federal employees, including lawyers, and to agents of government contrac-
tors, there are very few, if any, published reports of lawyers acting in this ca-
pacity.
172. See LUBAN, supra note 7, at 177-205 (discussing "the lawyer's ex-
traordinary duty of confidentiality"). For a critique of lawyers' adversary zeal
on behalf of clients, see MARVIN E. FRANKEL, PARTISAN JUSTICE 1-68 (1980);
Shaffer, Adversary Ethic, supra note 78, at 698-703.
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2. Discretionary versus mandatory disclosure: The relevance
of context and circumstance
Should exceptions to confidentiality be mandated by rule
or left to a lawyer's discretion? The arguments for and against
discretion are familiar.17 3 On one hand, a blanket command
provides more explicit guidance and, if followed by those to
whom it is directed, will lead to more uniform and predictable
responses. A clear duty helps avoid the problem of a client
being subjected, without advance disclosure, to differing re-
sponses and risks dependent upon the judgment or conscience
of individual lawyers. On the other hand, situations that actu-
ally arise are often morally complex ones in which practical
judgment is influenced by a variety of factors relating to con-
text, personalities, circumstances and relationships. The clar-
ity of the lawyer's knowledge concerning the likelihood of a cli-
ent's proposed conduct and of its threatened consequences
varies enormously from case to case. Additionally, wholly
apart from the merits, discretionary proposals are more likely
to commend themselves to lawyers who fear that mandatory
disclosure will lead to civil liability for failure to disclose. 174
173. The choice of detailed rules as distinct from general standards that
confer discretion on the applier and interpreter is the topic of a large juris-
prudential and philosophical literature. One modern treatment of the subject,
focusing on contract law, is Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private
Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976).
174. Emerging case law indicates that a lawyer risks civil liability to a de-
frauded party if the lawyer makes false or misleading representations in fa-
cilitating a client transaction with a third person, or if the lawyer learns of the
client's fraud but takes no action other than silent withdrawal. See, e.g., Fed-
eral Deposit Ins. Corp. v. O'Melveny & Myers, 969 F.2d 744 (9th Cir. 1992)
(law firm liable to successor in interest of a failed thrift for failing to make "a
reasonable, independent investigation" of indications that client was entering
into real estate syndications when in unsound financial condition), rev'd and
remanded on other grounds, 512 U.S. 79 (1994); Greycas, Inc. v. Proud, 826
F.2d 1560, 1565 (7th Cir. 1987) (lawyer liable to non-client for negligence in
preparing a legal opinion for the non-client in connection with a client trans-
action); In re American Continental Corp./Lincoln Say. & Loan Sec. Litig., 794
F. Supp. 1424, 1452 (D. Ariz. 1992) (law firm liable for aiding and abetting cli-
ent's fraud on investors if it learned of the fraud and continued to provide le-
gal assistance); Petrillo v. Bachenberg, 655 A.2d 1354, 1359-61 (N.J. 1995)
(lawyer for seller of real estate owed duty of care to buyer to avoid misleading
the buyer concerning suitability of land for a septic system). But cf Schatz v.
Rosenberg, 943 F.2d 485, 493-94 (4th Cir. 1991) (law firm not liable for trans-
mitting client's false representations of its net worth to a lender in a transac-
tion handled by the law firm). It is ironic that in the situation in which ethics
rules provide for disclosure (criminal acts of a client that threaten another's
life), there is no reported decision providing for civil liability of the lawyer for
118 [Vol. 83:63
PROFESSIONAL SECRECY
For these reasons, we prefer a discretionary approach, but rec-
ognize that a strong case can be made for mandating disclosure
in some situations.
One of the primary considerations when a lawyer is faced
with divulging confidential information against a client's inter-
est is what can be accomplished by disclosing the information.
For example, in examining the death-row scenario in which a
client informs his lawyer that he committed a crime for which
an innocent person awaits execution, William Hodes argues
that detrimental disclosure without client consent should not
be made when it is not likely to result in saving the life of the
person slated for execution. 7 5 He argues that the lawyer, be-
fore disclosing, should look at each situation in context and
first determine what can be accomplished by it.
We agree with Hodes that careful consideration should be
given to a wide range of factors, including the context in which
the issue arises, the surrounding circumstances, the relation-
ship between the lawyer, the client-actor and the victim, and
the consequences to client and others of disclosure and nondis-
closure' 7 6 The variety and uniqueness of the circumstances
that must be considered confirm our preference that, as a gen-
eral matter, exceptions to confidentiality be cast in discretion-
ary terms. Broad legal commands are unlikely to reflect the
moral complexity of many real-life situations. The lawyer must
consider the unique characteristics of the individual case as
well as its consonance with values held dear by the community.
Hodes' argument, however, goes too far in suggesting that
disclosure is appropriate only where the lawyer reasonably be-
lieves that the disclosure or use of confidential information
would be effective in preventing death or serious bodily injury
to a person177 Declining to make a limited disclosure on the
ground that it is likely to be futile or ineffective elevates a
sound insight-that the consequences of an act should be care-
failure to disclose, but cf. Hawkins v. King County, 602 P.2d 361 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1979) (noting in dictum that in an appropriate case a lawyer might be
liable for failing to warn the client's intended victim), while in the client fraud
situations liability is often imposed even though ABA Model Rule 1.6(b) and
the ethics codes of about ten states would prohibit a lawyer from disclosing.
See MODEL RULES, supra note 10, Rule 1.6(b).
175. Hodes, supra note 80, at 1560-81 ("MIhe specific context of each
case.., colors what can be done to alleviate the tragedy, which affects what
ought to be done.").
176. See HAZARD ET AL., supra note 8, at 323-25.
177. Hodes, supra note 80, at 1561.
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fully weighed before acting-into an unsatisfactory rule of
thumb: "It won't do any good anyway."
A death-row example may help illustrate the question
whether the lawyer should refrain from making a disclosure in
the belief that it is likely to be futile. 178 Without disclosure, the
convicted man will die as scheduled; even with disclosure the
execution may remain highly probable. In the logical sense,
disclosure is "necessary" even if not sufficient to prevent the
harm. It is true that in death-row situations prosecutors who
have been defending a conviction for a long time will be likely
to resist abandoning positions that are firmly entrenched.
Likewise, judges and other officials who have rejected all direct
and collateral attacks on the conviction and sentence will re-
quire an extraordinary showing to overcome considerations of
finality. Yet outcomes cannot be predicted with certainty ex-
cept that the termination of life is final and non-reversible.
Much will depend, of course, on the strength and plausi-
bility of the client's story. Is it just another false confession or
is it supported by corroborating detail that is not in the public
domain? Discussing the story with prosecutors familiar with
the record in the homicide case may be necessary to determine
preliminarily whether the client's confession is credible. In the
extraordinary case in which the client's story provides powerful
detail not present in the circumstantial evidence that led to the
wrongful conviction of another, a prosecutor or governor may
be moved to take action to protect the innocent.
A situation like Spaulding is different because it is much
more plausible to assume that disclosure will correct the prob-
lem and save a life. But treatment in a particular situation
may be a problematic solution or even, in the extreme case, to-
tally ineffective. Suppose that Dr. Hannah's report had re-
vealed that Spaulding was suffering from an inoperable termi-
nal condition caused by the accident. Disclosure in this
178. An analogy is suggestive. A lawyer representing an organization may
discover that those in control are engaged in law violations that are likely to
be harmful to the best interests of the entity. Without raising the question
with the governing board of the organization, the lawyer silently withdraws.
In subsequent litigation against the lawyer either by successors in interest or
third persons harmed by the illegal conduct, the lawyer's claim that raising
the issue with the governing board would have been futile is generally re-
jected. See e.g., In re American Continental Corp., 794 F. Supp. at 1453
(firm's obligation to take steps to stop an ongoing fraud in which its own
services were involved is not excused because those in control would not have
responded; "client wrongdoing cannot negate an attorney's fiduciary duty").
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situation would not be "necessary" to prevent the death, which
is going to occur anyway. Yet even in this situation a case can
be made for disclosure. Although there is no chance of saving
Spaulding under these assumed facts, the knowledge that one
will soon die is extremely important for emotional and religious
reasons for the person himself as well as his family. It is also
ethically dubious not to permit the individual a chance to pre-
pare for death with loved ones.
3. The effect of lawyer disclosure on the client's attorney-
client privilege
The professional duty of confidentiality and the attorney-
client privilege are separate doctrines, although they have
overlapping objectives. Therefore, it should be kept in mind
that the ethical propriety of a lawyer disclosing information
without the client's consent "tells us nothing about the admis-
sibility of the information . .. disclosed."179 Disclosure by a
lawyer in a situation permitted by the ethics rules, but without
the client's consent, does not waive the client's attorney-client
privilege in the communication that is privileged. 80 Although
the information inevitably becomes known to those to whom it
is revealed, and the disclosure may result in harm to the client,
the client retains the right to assert the privilege in any subse-
quent proceeding whether or not the client is a party.
In State v. Macumber,81 for example, a lawyer reported to
public officials that his client had committed a crime for which
another person had been convicted. The disclosure was viewed
as ethically permissible (i.e., not in violation of the lawyer's
duty of confidentiality).182 Nevertheless, the lawyer's testi-
179. Purcell v. District Attorney, 676 N.E.2d 436, 438 (Mass. 1997) (per
curiam).
180. See, for example, MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 127, at 440-
44, stating that "[t]he client is the holder of the privilege, and the attorney
cannot waive it over the client's objection." Actual or implied authority of the
attorney to waive the privilege "is determined by the customary rules of the
law of agency." Involuntary disclosures (e.g., where privileged matter is pro-
cured by fraud, deception, theft or an erroneous court determination of no
privilege) do not result in loss of the privilege.
181. 544 P.2d 1084 (Ariz. 1976) (per curiam) (reversing conviction and re-
manding for a new trial); State v. Macumber, 582 P.2d 162 (Ariz. 1978)(affirming conviction after second trial). The case is thoroughly discussed in
Hodes, supra note 80.
182. See Macumber, 544 P.2d at 1087 (Holohan, J., concurring specially).
The lawyers involved sought and obtained an ethics opinion concluding that
disclosure was permissible even though not literally covered by the exceptions
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mony concerning the client's communication was not admissi-
ble in a subsequent hearing challenging the allegedly wrongful
conviction. 83 In some states, the same result may be reached
under statutory provisions preventing state officials from using
any evidence flowing from a breach of the attorney-client
privilege. 84
In Purcell v. District Attorney,185 the Massachusetts Su-
preme Judicial Court held that a lawyer's permissible disclo-
sure of information did not necessarily waive the client's attor-
ney-client privilege. The client, a maintenance man with an
apartment in the building, had consulted the lawyer about
matters relating to loss of both job and apartment. Those
communications were privileged, but the state in a subsequent
criminal case against the client sought to compel the lawyer to
testify about the client's disclosure that he intended to set fire
to the apartment building. The court held that the privilege
was not waived by the lawyer's permitted disclosure under the
ethics code of the intended arson. The harder question was
whether the communication concerning the threatened arson
was admissible because of the crime-fraud exception to the
privilege-a determination that rested on whether the client
informed the lawyer of the intention to commit arson "for the
purpose of receiving legal advice" concerning the unlawful con-
duct.186 On remand in Purcell, the defense lawyer was not re-
in the Model Code of Professional Responsibility, then in effect in Arizona.
The client had not indicated an intention to commit a crime or fraud (DR 4-
101(C)(3)) 3ior had the client perpetrated a fraud upon a tribunal (DR 7-
102(B)(1)). The situation arose, however, after the client's death, who there-
fore could not be incriminated by the disclosure.
183. See Macumber, 544 P.2d at 1087 (Holohan, J., concurring specially)
(lawyer's permissible disclosure to authorities of client's information that he
was responsible for a crime for which another person had been convicted did
not waive the client's attorney-client privilege); see also State v. Valdez, 618
P.2d 1234, 1235 (N.M. 1980) (holding that lawyer could not testify that his cli-
ent had confessed to a robbery for which the defendant had been convicted).
Macumber and other cases dealing with the "death-row scenario" are thor-
oughly and ably discussed in Hodes, supra note 80.
184. See People v. Fentress, 425 N.Y.S.2d 485 (N.Y. Cty. Ct. 1980) (holding
evidence of corpus delicti admissible because client had waived the privilege
in accepting the lawyer's advice that police be called to the scene of the crime).
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4503 (1977) provides that "evidence of a confidential communi-
cation made between the attorney... and the client in the course of profes-
sional employment.., and evidence resulting therefrom, shall not be dis-
closed [by any governmental agency in any proceeding]."
185. 676 N.E.2d 436 (Mass. 1997) (per curiam).
186. See id. at 441.
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quired to testify against his client because the client's commu-
nication of the proposed arson, unlike those relating to the cli-
ent's job and housing, was not made for purposes of obtaining
legal advice.187
As Susan Martyn has stated in commenting on the Purcell
case:
Because [the court] approved of a lawyer's discretion to disclose a cli-
ent's intention to commit a serious future crime, it gave lawyers an
added incentive to do so when efforts to dissuade the client prove un-
successful. Lawyers who disclose this confidential information need
not worry that it can be used directly against the client in a subse-
quent proceeding, as long as the client sought legal advice about law-
ful matters. A lawyer can act to save lives, and at the same time
avoid being the instrument of the client's conviction.In
D. A PROPOSED CONFIDENTIALITY RULE
In light of the foregoing considerations, and in the hope
that state rule-makers will be stimulated by the ALI recom-
mendations and that the ABA will reconsider its position, we
offer the following proposed confidentiality rule for considera-
tion. Since most states have adopted some version of the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct, our proposal is cast in
terms employed in the Model Rules, and is intended as a com-
plete substitute for current Rule 1.6. Footnotes to each of the
paragraphs provide a brief explanation of the positions taken
by the authors.
Rule 1.6 Confidentiality of Information
(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to repre-
sentation of a client unless the client consents after consultation,
except for disclosures that are impliedly authorized to carry out
the representation, and except as stated in paragraphs (b) and
(C). 189
(b) A lawyer shall reveal such information when required
by law, court order, or other rules of professional conduct. 90
187. Telephone Interview by Lori P. Knowles with Jeffrey Purcell (Apr. 7,
1998).
188. Susan Martyn, The Restatement (3d) of the Law Governing Lawyers
and the Courts, PROF. LAW. 115, 124 (1997 Symposium Issue).
189. This paragraph is identical to Model Rule 1.6(a), except for the refer-
ence to the addition of paragraph (c).
190. This new paragraph, omitted from the text of Model Rule 1.6(a), is
similar to DR 4-101(C)(2) of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility and
to provisions in a great many states. It provides in the text of the rule a list of
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(c) A lawyer may reveal such information to the extent the
lawyer reasonably believes necessary:
(1) to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bod-
ily harm;191
(2) to prevent the wrongful incarceration or execution of an-
other;192
(3) to prevent commission of a criminal or fraudulent act
that the lawyer reasonably believes is likely to result in substan-
tial injury to the financial interests or property of another 93
(4) to rectify or mitigate a client fraud in which the lawyer's
services have been used; 94 or
(5) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in
a controversy between the lawyer and the client, to establish a
defense to a criminal charge or civil claim against the lawyer
based upon conduct in which the client was involved, or to re-
spond to allegations in any proceeding concerning the lawyer's
representation of the client.195
the situations in which disclosure of client information may be required.
Comment [51 to Model Rule 1.6 stated: "A lawyer may not disclose
[information relating to representation of a client] except as authorized or re-
quired by the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law."
191. This exception to confidentiality is broader than Model Rule 1.6(b)(1),
which permits disclosure "to prevent the client from committing a criminal act
that the lawyer believes is likely to result in imminent death or substantial
bodily harm .... " Disclosure is permitted under the proposed rule whenever
a person is threatened with "reasonably certain death or substantial bodily
harm." The various preconditions of the Model Rule provision are omitted:
the necessity of an act by the client that is criminal in character. The words
"reasonably certain" are substituted for the word "imminent," following the
lead of RESTATEMENT OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, supra note 12, section
117A.
192. See the discussion in the text at notes 161-62, supra.
193. See the discussion in the text at notes 137-50, supra. According to the
ALAS Memorandum, supra note 11, 38 states permit disclosure to prevent a
client's criminal fraud and 4 states extend the permission to non-criminal
fraud. Four states require a lawyer to disclose a client's prospect criminal
fraud. This provision is consistent with RESTATEMENT OF LAW GOVERNING
LAWYERS, supra note 12, section 1173, except that it does not limit disclosure
to situations in which the lawyer's services have been used.
194. See the discussion in the text at notes 137-150, supra. This provision
is consistent with the position expressed by the ALI in the RESTATEMENT OF
THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, supra note 12, section 11713.
195. This provision is identical to Model Rule 1.6(b)(2). A self-defense ex-
ception is found in the rules of all states except California, where the excep-
tion is supported by judicial decisions.
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CONCLUSION
Spaulding v. Zimmerman is a ghostly metaphor for the
silence of lawyers, judges and the organized bar on the moral
issues presented by lawyer secrecy.196 The reluctance of law-
yers and judges, both in and out of the courtroom, to talk forth-
rightly about the morality of lawyer behavior, is illustrated by
all the opinions and briefs in Spaulding. The trial judge
avoided discussing ethics rules or moral principles, but did
state that the defense lawyers acted in "good faith"-
presumably meaning that they were not morally accountable
because they were only doing their job under the adversary
system. The Minnesota Supreme Court expressed no view on
the law and ethics of the lawyering involved, other than to
make the ambiguous statement that "no canon of ethics or le-
gal obligation may have required [defense counsel] to inform
plaintiff or his counsel" of the life-threatening condition.197
The court's unwillingness to comment on the conduct of
the parties and lawyers, or to declare legal principles of any
kind relating to them, left a strong impression upon several of
the lawyers involved. Robert Gislason, representing Spaulding
on the appeal, recalls that, when he stood to present his argu-
ment to the court, one of the judges stated, "Counsel, there is
no need for comments on the ethics of other attorneys in-
196. The most extreme case of silence and denial concerning issues of pro-
fessional confidentiality is in California, where leaders of the bar often state
that the professional duty of confidentiality is an absolute one not qualified by
any exceptions. It is true that California's court rules governing lawyers' pro-
fessional conduct do not deal explicitly with confidentiality, but the talk of an
absolute duty ignores at least a half-dozen exceptions recognized by California
case law. In addition, a recent decision of the California Supreme Court holds
that all of the exceptions to California's statutory attorney-client privilege are
also exceptions to the lawyer's duty of confidentiality. See General Dynamics
Corp. v. Superior Court, 876 P.2d 487, 503 (Cal. 1994) (in-house lawyer's con-
fidentiality obligations are determined by "some statute or ethical rule, such
as the statutory exceptions to the attorney-client privilege.... ."); see also
People v. Cox, 809 P.2d 351 (Cal. 1991) (lawyer must reveal client's threat to
harm the court or court personnel to the trial judge); Hinds v. State Bar, 119
P.2d 134 (Cal. 1941) (lawyer who learns of client's prior fraud on the court in a
matrimonial proceeding must "divulge such fact to the court" if the client re-
fuses to correct the false statement). See Cramton, Sure Enough?, supra note
157, at 6; Cramton, Trade Secrets, supra note 157, at 17. For further discus-
sion of confidentiality in California, see Cramton, supra note 152; Zacharias,
supra note 152.
197. Spaulding v. Zimmerman, 116 N.W.2d 704, 710 (Minn. 1962)
(emphasis added).
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volved."198 Justice Rogosheske recalls that he had a high re-
gard for, and personal relationship with, a senior partner of
one of the defense lawyers involved in the case; he did not want
to embarrass his friend by "exposing the friend's partner to
criticism."'199
Other lawyer participants in Spaulding report a macabre
dance in which the real issues in the case-how human beings
should behave toward one another when human life is at
stake-were skirted by technical legal arguments about a trial
court's discretion to reopen a minor's settlement and whether a
petition to approve a settlement was a joint petition or merely
that of the party submitting it. Richard Pemberton and Robert
Gislason report that they were aware that Spaulding's perma-
nent injuries might have been prevented by disclosure and that
the case was really about moral conduct. Pemberton, who was
new to practice at the time, believes he was asked to brief and
argue the case in the Minnesota Supreme Court because his
senior partner found the task a distasteful one, as did Pember-
ton:
[Wihen I briefed and argued the Spaulding case in the Supreme
Court, I was within the first few months of legal practice and was at-
tempting to defend a senior partner's handling of the matter in the
trial court. After 20 years of practice, I would like to think that I
would have disclosed the aneurysm of the aorta as an act of humanity
and without regard to the legalities involved, just as I surely would
now. You might suggest to your students in the course on profes-
sional responsibility that a pretty good rule for them to practice re-
specting professional conduct is to do the decent thing.2°0
As it turned out, of course, David Spaulding, present
whereabouts unknown, did not die of a massive coronary hem-
orrhage. Some months after the settlement, during a military
reserve examination, his long-time physician, Dr. Cain, discov-
ered the aortic aneurysm and corrective treatment was begun
immediately.201 However, David Spaulding suffered a further
injury, for which an additional insurance payment is inade-
198. Telephone Interview by Lori P. Knowles with Robert Gislason (Sept.
18, 1997).
199. Telephone Interview with Justice Walter Rogosheske (Retired), supra
note 15.
200. Letter of Richard L. Pemberton to Dr. Jay Katz, Professor of Law and
Psychiatry (Nov. 30, 1981).
201. See Spaulding, 116 N.W.2d at 708.
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quate compensation: as a consequence of the delayed treatment
of his aneurysm, he forever lost most of his voice.202
Why do lawyers and judges "lose their voice" when it
comes to speaking about moral conduct and exceptions to con-
fidentiality? Why does professional silence greet the moral ar-
gument that a good person, including a lawyer, should take
reasonable steps to prevent death or substantial injury to third
persons?
Recent developments discussed in this article suggest that
the silence may be lifting. We sincerely hope so.
202. Telephone Interview with Robert Gislason, supra note 198.
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